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AN INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE ON
POLITICAL INFORMATIONAL WARFARE: THE
CHALLENGES OF COMBATING THE WEAPONIZED
USE OF CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND
DISINFORMATION TO UNDERMINE DEMOCRACY
K IMBERLY B REEDON *

I.

INTRODUCTION

Illiberal authoritarian regimes have in recent years employed
increasingly effective online disinformation, conspiracy theory, and other
psychological influence campaigns designed to manipulate voter opinionmaking and political outcomes in democratic societies.1 Disturbingly,
domestic public officials in democratic societies are also increasingly joining
or even initiating such informational warfare2 campaigns against their own
citizens. In this environment, the implications for international law
development merit scrutiny.
One issue warranting attention is how the role of domestic political
actors in advancing disinformation campaigns and other tools of
informational warfare may undermine the consent requirement of the
sovereignty principle and may implicate the coercion element of the nonintervention principle of international law. In other words, when a target
State’s complicit governmental actors perpetuate disinformation campaigns,
*

Assistant Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University College of Law.
Author’s note: A heartfelt thanks to Julianna Burchett and Ellaheh Sims for their
excellent research assistance; to the participants of the University of St. Thomas
School of Law Journal of Law & Public Policy Spring Symposium: Alternative
Realities, Conspiracy Theory, and the Constitutional and Democratic Order for their
insights and perspectives; and to Mark Summers for his helpful comments and
suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper. All errors, of course, are mine.
1
See, e.g., CATHERINE A. THEOHARY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45142,
INFORMATION WARFARE: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2018); EDWARD LUCAS & PETER
POMERANZEV, CTR EUR. POL’Y ANALYSIS, REPORT, WINNING THE INFORMATION
WAR: TECHNIQUES AND COUNTER-STRATEGIES TO RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA IN
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE (2016), https://cepa.org/cepa_files/2016-CEPAreport-Winning_the_Information_War.pdf; OFF. DIR. NAT’L INTEL., ANNUAL
THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (2021).
2
See infra, Part I.B, C.
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thereby tacitly allowing, explicitly encouraging, or even actively facilitating,
intervention by a foreign State in the target State’s democratic opinionmaking, does the conduct by domestic actors operate to circumvent a foreign
State’s duty of non-intervention without the target State’s consent, as applied
to online operations seeking to manipulate voting behavior? This Article
examines some of the difficulties posed by the present international legal
framework in answering that question. First, however, a brief caveat: the
purpose and scope of this Article are limited to identifying some of the
relevant questions for further research relating to the weaponization of
conspiracy theories and disinformation to manipulate democratic decisionmaking, and to sketching out under-theorized corollary considerations
relating to the development of customary international law as to information
warfare. This Article does not offer a complete survey of the current state of
affairs in this area, nor does it propose analytical solutions to the issues
identified. The goal, rather, is to shine a light on, and to prompt discussion
of, these issues.
The discussion proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the problem,
including examples of past and apparently ongoing disinformation and
conspiracy theory campaigns initiated or amplified both by authoritarian
regimes targeting democratic opinion-making in other states and by domestic
political officials and their proxies. Specifically, Part I will briefly explore
relevant events in Estonia, Poland, and the United States.
Part II reviews relevant international law principles, including both
the background and the current status of those principles as applied to online
operations targeting voter opinion-making and political preferences. More
particularly, Part II will discuss the international law principles of
sovereignty and non-intervention, including the discrete aspects of those
rules that may create difficulties for customary international law
development when target states facilitate a foreign state’s information
warfare by remaining silent. In addition, Part II considers the principle of
self-determination as an alternative, if unconventional, basis for holding
infringing governments accountable for interference with a target state’s
democratic opinion-making.
Part III explains the need for clarity on the application of
international rules as applied to cyber-based activities and discusses the
difficulties that states’ silence poses for the development of customary
international law in this area. Part IV then examines some of the challenges
that arise in the application of the international law principles to cyberspace
when complicit or aligned domestic government heads are either involved in
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perpetuating the same conspiracy theories or disinformation campaigns as
those propagated by a foreign government seeking to manipulate the
democratic opinion-making in the target State or when those domestic
government heads are silent in the face of such activities and that silence has
been corruptly or coercively secured by the foreign State. Finally, Part V
offers a brief conclusion.

II.

EXAMPLES OF CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND DISINFORMATION
CAMPAIGNS TARGETING DEMOCRATIC OPINION MAKING

To contextualize the issues which may arise under international law
relating to a foreign State’s cyber-based activities that use conspiracy
theories and disinformation campaigns to manipulate the democratic
opinion-making of another State, under circumstances in which the target
State fails to object to, or seeks to counter, such campaigns, this Part provides
examples of two categories of information warfare campaigns: (1) the
weaponized use of such campaigns by political leaders against their own
citizens; and (2) the weaponized use of such campaigns by a State against the
population of another State. The first category demonstrates that the
government leader of a State which is the target of a foreign State’s cyber
operations that propagate and amplify conspiracy theories and disinformation
campaigns may be willing to accept those operations if they prove politically
or personally beneficial to him or her. The second category demonstrates that
these sorts of campaigns, sometimes called “hostile measures,” present
ongoing threats to democratic governance.
First, however, it is worth pausing for a moment to consider the goals
of foreign governments in conducting cyber operations of this type. In this
regard, Russia is representative. Although by no means the only government
to employ such tactics,3 Russia, which has a long history of using hostile
measures to advance its interests,4 presents a particularly aggressive and
3

Marisa Endicott, Propaganda’s New Goals: Create Confusion, Sow Doubt,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 31, 2017, https://www.usnews.com/news/nationalnews/articles/2017-01-31/russian-propagandas-new-goals-create-confusion-sowdoubt (“The Kremlin is not alone in pushing disinformation campaigns. Propaganda
from the Islamic State group (also known as ISIS), Israel and China abounds...”).
4
STEPHANIE YOUNG & BRENNA ALLEN, RAND CORP., RUSSIA’S HOSTILE
MEASURES: COMBATING RUSSIAN GRAY ZONE AGGRESSION AGAINST NATO IN THE
CONTACT, BLUNT, AND SURGE LAYERS OF COMPETITION APP. A 77 (2020); LUCAS
& POMERANZEV, supra note 1, at 11; Endicott, supra note 3 (“Russia’s propaganda
efforts are well-established, dating back through the Cold War and Soviet era all the
way to the Russian Revolution in 1917.”).
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successful example, having employed various measures against multiple
countries targeting vulnerabilities across myriad sectors.5 Among other
examples of hostile measures that Russia has used in the past dozen or so
years, the most salient for purposes of this Article are intervening in the
domestic political movements in target states and launching disinformation
campaigns directed at target states’ polities.6 Russia, like other illiberal
regimes, uses hostile measures, such as cyber-attacks and disinformation
campaigns to achieve specific objectives with one long-term goal: weakening
and dismantling liberal western democracies.7 According to a report
published in April 2021 by the United States Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, the specific objectives used to achieve this goal are
illustrated by Russia’s information warfare against the United States and
include the following: undermining the position of the United States as a
global leader, sowing internal discord, influencing American voters, and
shaping decision-making by the U.S. government.8 In addition, such
operations aim to create doubt about the legitimacy of electoral outcomes9
and to undermine the stability and security of western democratic alliances.10
5

STEPHANIE PEZARD, ET AL., RAND CORP., RUSSIA’S HOSTILE MEASURES:
COMBATING RUSSIAN GRAY ZONE AGGRESSION AGAINST NATO IN THE CONTACT,
BLUNT, AND SURGE LAYERS OF COMPETITION APP. B (2020).
6
Id.; OFF. DIR. NAT’L INTEL., supra note 1, at 11 (“Russia presents one of the
most serious intelligence threats to the United States...influencing US voters and
decisionmaking. Russia will continue to advance its technical collection and
surveillance capabilities and probably will share its technology and expertise with
other . . . US adversaries.”).
7
“A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged
citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation.... Today,
actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the
legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial
networks, and personal data.” THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 14 (Dec. 2017), https://trumpwhitehouse.arch
ives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.
8
OFF. DIR. NAT’L INTEL., supra note 1, at 11 (“Moscow almost certainly views
US elections as an opportunity to try to undermine US global standing, sow discord
inside the United States, influence US decisionmaking, and sway US voters. Moscow
conducted influence operations against US elections in 2016, 2018, and 2020.”). See
also Steven J. Barela, Cross-Border Cyber Ops to Erode Legitimacy: An Act of
Coercion, JUST SECURITY, Jan. 12, 2017, https://www.justsecurity.org/36212/crossborder-cyber-ops-erode-legitimacy-act-coercion.
9
Barela, supra note 8.
10
BEN CONNABLE, ET AL., RAND CORP., RUSSIA’S HOSTILE MEASURES:
COMBATING RUSSIAN GRAY ZONE AGGRESSION AGAINST NATO IN THE CONTACT,
BLUNT, AND SURGE LAYERS OF COMPETITION, at iii (2020).
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Given these objectives, the particulars of information warfare
campaigns tend to be tailored to the specific circumstances of the State where
they are employed.11 Some examples will illustrate. The following
subsections discuss information warfare campaigns aimed at the democratic
opinion-making of, respectively, Estonia, Poland, and the United States.

A. Estonia – The Bronze Soldier
Soon after the tiny Baltic country of Estonia joined the European
Union and the North American Treaty Organization in 2004, Russia
intensified an ongoing campaign to exacerbate tensions and divisions
between the nation’s ethnic Russian minority,12 which accounts for
approximately 25% of the population, and its Estonian majority.13 The focus
for this effort eventually, and effectively, centered on a statue located in a
park in the center of the capitol city, Tallinn: The Bronze Soldier.14 Erected
during the Soviet Union’s occupation of Estonia after World War II,
ostensibly as a monument to honor the fallen soldiers of the Red Army in
their fight to “liberate” Estonia from Nazi Germany,15 the statue became a
symbol of the divisions between ethnic Russian Estonians and the nonRussian majority in the post-independence era.16
The Kremlin, recognizing and capitalizing on these tensions, has
used them as the basis for its information warfare campaign against Estonia

11

Endicott, supra note 3 (“Russian disinformation . . . targets different
communities using different languages in countries all over the world with messages
and methods uniquely tailored to each audience.”).
12
LUCAS & POMERANZEV, supra note 1, at 21.
13
Stefan Meister, et al., Institute für Auslandsbeziehungen, Understanding
Russian Communication Strategy: Case Studies of Serbia and Estonia, IFA EDITION
CULTURE & FOREIGN POL’Y 33 (2018), https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168ssoar-59979-0.
14
NINA JANKOWICZ, HOW TO LOSE THE INFORMATION WAR: RUSSIA, FAKE
NEWS, AND THE FUTURE OF CONFLICT 21, 24-34 (2020) (The formal title of the statue
is the Soviet Monument to the Liberators of Tallinn.); Meister, et al., supra note 13.
15
JANKOWICZ, supra note 14, at 24-25.
16
Francis Tapon, The Bronze Soldier Explains Why Estonia Prepares for A
Russian Cyberattack, FORBES, July 7, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/francista
pon/2018/07/07/the-bronze-soldier-statue-in-tallinn-estonia-give-balticheadaches/?sh=607f9c98c7a0 (“For many Estonians, the Bronze Soldier represents
48 years of Soviet oppression. Meanwhile, Russians believe that the statue represents
the triumph over the Nazis.”).
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to perpetuate “the perception of a growing anti-Russian movement” there.17
As is often the case with effective disinformation, this narrative contained
some truth to it. The source of Estonia’s ethnic divisions is deeply rooted.
Russians who lived in Estonia when it regained its independence in 1991
were subjected to newly enacted citizenship laws that required proficiency in
the Estonian language. Those unable to meet the language requirements were
denied not only Estonian citizenship, but also access to certain public
services, including public education. Disparities between ethnic Russians and
Estonians continued, and the discontent of the Russian-speaking minority
grew.18
For its part, during the early 2000’s, shortly after Vladimir Putin
became Russia’s President, the Kremlin sought to reinforce RussianEstonians’ cultural and linguistic ties to Russia by implementing a strategy
to rally the Russian diaspora in Estonia around Soviet symbols and
celebrations of “Victory Day”—the date commemorating the Soviet Union’s
declaration of victory over Nazi Germany.19 Accordingly, as RussianEstonians became increasingly dissatisfied with their disparate treatment by
the Estonian government, and as the Kremlin targeted them with propaganda
campaigns, both to stoke divisions internally and to draw ethnically RussianEstonians closer to Russia, the size of the Victory Day celebrations increased
by the year, and the Bronze Soldier “[became] an increasingly significant
symbol of unity for ethnic Russians.”20 It also served as the flashpoint for
“the worst civil unrest” in post-independence Estonia: an overnight period of
rioting in April 2007, known as the “Bronze Night.”21
Though culminating on the Bronze Night, conflict involving the
Bronze Soldier had long been simmering. In 2005, members of Nashi, a
Russian nationalist youth organization funded by the Kremlin, began
participating in the Victory Day celebrations near the statue.22 At a 2006
Victory Day observance, a group of Estonian nationals carrying the Estonian
17

Meister, et. al., supra note 13 (Among Russia’s broader objectives that it
sought to achieve by conducting this information warfare campaign was to weaken
support for Estonia from its international allies, especially its western democratic
allies in Europe and the United States, by creating the perception that the Estonian
population consisted of “closet Nazis” who were “xenophobic, intolerant, and
hostile.”); LUCAS & POMERANZEV, supra note 1, at 21.
18
JANKOWICZ, supra note 14, at 25.
19
Id. at 26-27; LUCAS & POMERANZEV, supra note 1, at 22.
20
LUCAS & POMERANZEV, supra note 1, at 22.
21
Id. at 22-23.
22
JANKOWICZ, supra note 14, at 30.
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flag made a counter-appearance in response to the ethnic Russian
celebrations.23 Because the Estonian group was significantly smaller, and
because the situation was volatile, the Estonian police, fearing violent
confrontations between the two sides, removed the Estonian group.24 At
some point during the 2006 Victory Day celebration, an Estonian flag was
torn down.25
In response to the growing tensions and in the aftermath of the 2006
Victory Day conflict, as the Estonian government debated whether to move
the Bronze Statue from its central location in the capital to a military
cemetery on the edge of town,26 a group of ethnic Russians, with the aid of
the Russian Embassy in Estonia, formed the “Nochnoi Dozor” (translated
into English as “Night Watch”),27 an organization with the self-appointed
task of guarding the monument during the overnight hours from any efforts
the Estonian government might take to dismantle and relocate it at
nighttime.28
Meanwhile, rumors proliferated about what may lay buried beneath
the monument. According to one report, speculation ran the gamut about
what the site interred—from deceased patients from a nearby hospital to
executed criminals to inebriated Soviet soldiers whose own tanks had run
over them.29 By April 2007, the Estonian government had decided to
excavate the site to ascertain what, if anything, had been buried there to be
able to relocate “the monument and any remains...honorably and properly.”30
The excavation began, out of public view behind a fence and tent, on the
morning of April 26.31 As the day progressed—after weeks of anti-Estonian
propaganda in Russian media, including accusations that the Estonian
government was “attempting to destroy the memorial and desecrate the
23

Id. at 31.
Id.
25
LUCAS & POMERANZEV, supra note 1, at 22.
26
Id.; see also Meister, et al., supra note 13, at 32.
27
LUCAS & POMERANZEV, supra note 1, at 22.
28
JANKOWICZ, supra note 14, at 32; see also Meister, et al., supra note 13, at 32
(noting that the Nochnoi Dozor “took an active role in protecting the monument”)
(The Estonian Internal Security Service has attributed the formation of the Nochnoi
Dozor to Russian intelligence figures and believes that the Russian Federal Security
Service (the FSB) is responsible for coordinating a number of operations relating to
the Bronze Soldier, including the spread of propaganda and disinformation.); LUCAS
& POMERANZEV, supra note 1, at 22-24.
29
Tapon, supra note 16.
30
JANKOWICZ, supra note 14, at 33.
31
Id.
24
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memory of Russian soldiers who fought the Nazis”—hundreds of people
gathered at the site.32 By early evening, rioting had begun.33 Throughout the
night and into the next day, rioters clashed with law enforcement, attacked
public buildings, and destroyed private property.34 Against this backdrop,
during the early morning hours of April 27, the Estonian government decided
to relocate the statue immediately, even as the rioting continued.35 Within
only a few hours of that decision, the monument had been removed.36
The events leading up to and including the Bronze Night were
accompanied by the steady drumbeat of Russian propaganda and
disinformation. Indeed, according to a report by the Center for European
Policy and Analysis, the Bronze Night “was an excellent example of a
carefully prepared and executed Russian disinformation campaign....”37 After
the removal of the Bronze Statue, however, the disinformation efforts kicked
into high gear. Russian state media is the primary source of information for
Russian-Estonians, and even before the Bronze Night, Russian outlets
presented the prospect of the monument’s removal as “an attack against
Russia’s cultural values, the Russian language, human rights, religious
beliefs and the nation’s sacred origins.”38 As the events of the Bronze Night
unfolded, and in the days that followed, Russian media blended video footage
from Tallinn, which was sometimes staged or faked, with reports that relied
on “distortions, half-truths, and outright lies.”39
For a population primed to believe that the decision to move the
Bronze Soldier was “a sinister assault on Russian culture,”40 RussianEstonians were all too prepared to believe the narratives supplied by Russian
media, which, among other things, falsely described violent acts of
vandalism by ethnically Russian youth gangs as peaceful demonstrations;
asserted fabricated acts of police brutality; and lied that Estonian officials
had cut the Bronze Soldier in half instead of relocating it.41 In this stew of
disinformation, additional conspiracy theories took root, including rumors
that the remains of soldiers interred beneath the statue had been excavated
32

LUCAS & POMERANZEV, supra note 1, at 23.
JANKOWICZ, supra note 14, at 33.
34
LUCAS & POMERANZEV, supra note 1, at 23.
35
Id.
36
JANKOWICZ, supra note 14, at 35.
37
LUCAS & POMERANZEV, supra note 1, at 21.
38
Id. at 22.
39
Id. at 23.
40
Endicott, supra note 3.
41
LUCAS & POMERANZEV, supra note 1, at 23.
33
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and discarded and that the Russian-Estonians who had tried to protect the
statue had been tortured.42 Fortunately for Estonia, the rioting was quashed
relatively quickly, and the worst case scenario—entrenched political
instability—was averted.43 Equally significant, however, was Estonia’s
whole-of-government long-term response to the crisis, which has included a
concerted effort both to counter Russian disinformation and to bridge
disparities that for so long divided the country.44
The Estonian government’s united efforts to fight Russian
disinformation and to address the underlying societal rifts that make certain
parts of its population susceptible to it stand in stark contrast to the
willingness of Polish political leaders to weaponize conspiracy theories and
disinformation for political gain.

B. Poland – The Smolensk Plane Crash
National tragedy struck Poland on April 10, 2010, when an airplane
carrying Polish President Lech Kaczynski and nearly 100 high-level
government officials crashed near the Russian town of Smolensk.45 No one
survived.46 In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, Poles were united in
their mourning of the devastating loss of life and leadership.47 Unfortunately,
however, the disaster that killed President Kaczynski and the delegation of
government officials accompanying him also gave birth to a host of divisive
conspiracy theories centering around the belief that Russia was responsible
for deliberately downing the aircraft.48 According to a nationwide poll
conducted nearly a decade after the crash, at least 26% of Polish citizens
wrongly believed that Russia had planned a coordinated attack on the plane,
perhaps for the purpose of assassinating the President.49 Russia, for its part,
has been happy to witness the internal political turmoil caused by the plane
crash, and though many of its actions, such as refusing to return the wreckage
of the plane to Poland, have tended—perhaps intentionally—to fan the
conspiracy-theory flame, Russia did not originate the disinformation
42

Id.
Id. at 23-24.
44
JANKOWICZ, supra note 14, at 42-51.
45
Id. at 87, 89; Monika Sieradzka, Smolensk: The Tragedy that Defined Polish
Politics, DEUTSCHE WELLE, Apr. 10, 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/smolensk-thetragedy-that-defined-polish-politics/a-43328611.
46
JANKOWICZ, supra note 14, at 89; Sieradzka, supra note 45.
47
JANKOWICZ, supra note 14, at 90; Sieradzka, supra note 45.
48
JANKOWICZ, supra note 14, at 95; Sieradzka, supra note 45.
49
JANKOWICZ, supra note 14, at 95; Sieradzka, supra note 45.
43
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campaign;50 Poland inflicted that particular wound on herself.51 Fueling the
conspiracy theories have been the political calculations of the leader of
Poland’s ruling Law and Justice Party (translated from the Polish Prawo i
Sprawedliwosc and abbreviated as “PiS”), Jaroslaw Kaczynski, Lech
Kaczynski’s twin brother, who, despite having reportedly admitted to an aide
that he did not believe the conspiracy theories, has not only declined to tamp
them down, but instead has perpetuated them to gain political advantage.52
Kaczynski even went so far as to accuse the opposition party of colluding
with Russia to down the plane.53
Several official investigations conducted by both Poland and Russia
concluded that human error, poor visibility, and the state of disrepair of the
landing strip were the combined causes of the crash,54 but even as the facts
increasingly pointed to accidental causes, Kaczynski reaffirmed his public
embrace of conspiracy theories, referring to the crash as “an unprecedented
crime” and calling for a parliamentary investigation.55 After prevailing in the
2015 election, winning the presidency and a parliamentary majority, the PiS
government took several actions that operated to entrench a conspiracy
theory as official policy: first, it “removed the original crash report from [the
government’s] website”;56 second, it “officially reopened the investigation
into the crash”;57 third, it “created a new commission to explore [the] causes
[of the crash]”;58 finally, and ghoulishly, it “exhumed crash victims,
searching for traces of explosives on their bodies.”59 The effects of
propagating conspiracy theories in service of the PiS’s political machinations
have been to polarize Polish voters, causing the nation to focus its attentions
inwardly, and to diminish Poland’s standing among its western allies—all

50
In Poland’s case, Russia did not launch cyber operations creating or amplifyi
ng conspiracy theories or disinformation campaigns. JANKOWICZ, supra note 14, at
95.
51
Id. at 93.
52
Id. at 95; Sieradzka, supra note 45.
53
JANKOWICZ, supra note 14, at 94.
54
JANKOWICZ, supra note 14, at 92; Sieradzka, supra note 45.
55
JANKOWICZ, supra note 14, at 94.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
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inuring to Russia’s benefit and advancing the Kremlin’s long-term
objectives.60
Although the example of Poland’s recent experience with its
government’s use of conspiracy theories as part of a political calculus does
not involve a foreign State’s cyber-based disinformation,61 and therefore the
questions this Article raises relating to international law are not directly
implicated, this example demonstrates some of the potential motivations that
a domestic government head may have to remain silent in the face of foreign
cyber campaigns using conspiracy theories and disinformation to manipulate
democratic opinion-making. These motivations, including domestic political
benefits, have been on full display in recent years in the United States.

C. The United States – “Stop the Steal”
Emerging and young democracies like Estonia and Poland may be
thought to be more vulnerable to information warfare that seeks to
manipulate democratic opinion-making, but established democracies are not
immune. If Estonia offers an example of a foreign State’s use of
disinformation and conspiracy theories to manipulate domestic public
opinion in a target State, and if Poland offers an example of information
warfare wielded by powerful domestic actors, with an assist from a foreign
State, to manipulate public opinion for their own political gain, then the
United States offers an example of the two threads woven together.62 Indeed,
one scholar, who has described the tactics used by Russia in the Bronze Night
campaign against Estonia as “an early indication” of similarly employed
means “that would be unleashed on the United States within a decade”63 and
the use of conspiracy theories by Poland’s governing party, PiS, for shortterm political gain as “polariz[ing] . . . in the long term,”64 has observed that
the United States government under then-President Donald Trump
demonstrated an unsettling willingness to “stealthily crack open the Russian

60

Id. at 94-95. Poland is well known for its ability to identify and resist
disinformation campaigns originating from Russia, which makes the nation’s
susceptibility to domestic-based disinformation noteworthy.
61
Russia does not launch disinformation campaigns to create new messages, but
it does make use of “toxic memes” to amplify and to exacerbate societal discord
and divisions. LUCAS & POMERANZEV, supra note 1, at 30.
62
See discussion infra at notes 116-121and accompanying text.
63
JANKOWICZ, supra note 14, at 23.
64
Id. at 203.
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playbook for political gain.”65 Following Trump’s lead, other domestic
actors, including a major political party and its politically sympathetic news
media, have now adopted the same active measures against the American
public that have previously been the province of malign foreign actors,
elevating disinformation and mainstreaming conspiracy theories.66 For
example, Republican lawmakers were quick to adopt a conspiracy theory that
Ukraine, not Russia, interfered in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.67
Despite warnings from national security experts about the danger to U.S.
national security interests that these active measures pose,68 domestic actors
have continued—indeed, have redoubled their efforts—to seed one
particularly insidious disinformation campaign: that the 2020 presidential
election was stolen from the Republican candidate through fraud or other
unlawful means.69 The various elements of this campaign have created
65

Id. (providing examples and arguing that “[t]he United States has ventured
farther down this road than any other government profiled in [Jankowicz’s] book”).
66
See Heather Digby Parton, “Stop the Steal” is Becoming the GOP’s
Permanent Rallying Cry, SALON, May 10, 2021 (“Because . . . the entire party from
Ted Cruz, R-Tx., and Marjorie Taylor Green, R-Ga, to House Minority Leader Kevin
McCarthy, R-Calif., [is] all buying into the notion that Trump’s Jan. 6th gambit to
overturn the election was legitimate, it’s clear that’s become conventional wisdom
in the GOP as well.”).
67
David Smith, Fiona Hill: Stop ‘Fictional Narrative’ of Ukraine Meddling in
US Election, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 21, 2019 (“Some Republicans on the [House]
intelligence committee have pushed a discredited conspiracy theory, embraced by
Trump and amplified by conservative media, that Ukraine, rather than Russia,
meddled in the last election.”); Jake Tapper, GOP-led Committee Probed Possible
Ukraine Interference in 2016 Election and Found Nothing Worth Pursuing, Sources
Say, CNN, Dec. 3, 2019 (“Some Republican lawmakers continue to misleadingly
say that the government of Ukraine interfered in the 2016 election on the same level
as Russia, despite the GOP-led committee looking into the matter and finding little
to support the allegation....The conspiracy theory that Ukraine, not Russia, interfered
in the US election was pushed publicly by Russian President Vladimir Putin in
February 2017 and has been since pushed by Trump, his attorney Rudy Giuliani,
and—most recently—Sen. John Kennedy, a Republican of Louisiana.”).
68
For example, during testimony to the House Intelligence Committee, Fiona
Hill, former National Security Council Director for European and Russian Affairs,
warned committee members: “Based on questions and statements I have heard, some
of you on this committee appear to believe that Russia and its security services did
not conduct a campaign against our country – and that perhaps, somehow, for some
reason, Ukraine did. This is a fictional narrative that has been perpetrated and
propagated by the Russian security services themselves.” Smith, supra note 67.
69
Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, #StopTheSteal: Timeline of
Social Media and Extremist Activities Leading to 1/6 Insurrection, JUST SECURITY
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disturbing consequences for the body politic, including, among other things,
undermining public trust in the nation’s election integrity and other
democratic institutions; creating a false perception of illegitimacy of the
current administration; and stoking extremist violence against government
officials.70 Together, these efforts undermine the U.S. constitutional and
democratic order.71 And illiberal foreign regimes have noticed. They have
used social and traditional media to amplify, and, in some cases, to generate
the conspiracy theories and disinformation campaigns, with the goal of
dismantling western liberal democracies.72
When the government leader of a democratic country which has been
targeted by a foreign State with political information warfare intentionally
advances the same false narratives, questions necessarily arise concerning
the extent, if any, to which the foreign State has successfully corrupted or
compromised the target State’s leader.73 Such is the situation in which the
United States currently finds itself. Today’s Republican Party in the United

(Feb. 10, 2021), https://www.justsecurity.org/74622/stopthesteal-timeline-of-socialmedia-and-extremist-activities-leading-to-1-6-insurrection/.
70
See, e.g., Harry Enten, Polls Show Majority of Republicans Mistakenly Think
the 2020 Election Wasn’t Legitimate, CNN (Apr. 11, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/
2021/04/11/politics/voting-restrictions-analysis/index.html;
Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, supra note 69 (reporting on alleg
ed kidnaping plot against Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer).
71
See, e.g., Warning of a Democracy in Peril, Harvard Scholars Join National
Call for Federal Action to Protect Elections, HARV. KENNEDY SCH. (June 8, 2021),
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/faculty-research/policy-topics/democracygovernance/warning-democracy-peril-harvard-scholars-join; Allison Durkee, ExElection Security Chief Krebs Says GOP’s Refusal to Concede Election ‘Corrosive’
To Democracy, FORBES (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/alisondurke
e/2020/12/16/ex-election-security-chief-chris-krebs-says-gop-refusal-to-concedeelection-corrosive-to-democracy/?sh=49b2320d9c01.
72
JANKOWICZ, supra note 14, at xvii:
Unlike Soviet propaganda, which sought to promote a specific
communist-centric worldview, the Kremlin divides and
deceives populations around the world, with one goal in mind:
the destruction of Western democracy as we know it. Russian
deceptions exploit fissures in targeted societies to sow doubt,
distrust, discontent and to further divide populations and their
governments. The ultimate goal is to undermine democracy—
and in particular, the American variety...—and drive citizens
to disengage.
73
Further, to the extent that the government leader’s political party follows suit,
similar questions abound concerning their support for foreign-sourced
disinformation campaigns against the members of their own polity.
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States, at the behest of the party leader and former head of state, has all too
readily embraced multiple conspiracy theories and disinformation
campaigns, and it appears even to have initiated a few of its own.74 The most
pernicious of these efforts, at least as far as the health of American
democracy is concerned, is the propagation of the baseless claim that the
Democratic Party’s candidate for the 2020 presidential election, Joseph R.
Biden, III, had “stolen” the election from the Republican Party’s candidate,
Donald J. Trump, by, among other things, conspiring with voting machine
manufacturers to switch votes that had been cast for Trump by recording
them as votes cast for Biden.75 Multiple official recounts, including some
hand recounts, have vindicated the conclusion—reached by state election
officials, then-Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
(CISA) Agency Christopher C. Krebs, and then-Attorney General William
P. Barr—that the election results were not tainted, that there was no evidence
of significant or widespread voter fraud, and that Biden was the legitimate
winner of the presidential election.76
Nevertheless, federal and state Republican elected officials, pressed
and pressured by Trump and his close allies, continued the disinformation
campaign across media platforms of every kind (social media, television,
radio, and newspapers), advancing and refining the conspiracy theory that
Trump had actually won the election; that Biden’s win was illegitimate
because of rampant voter fraud and vote tampering; that the results of the
election should therefore be overturned; and that Trump should be installed
as President for second term.77 For months, right-wing commentators in
legacy media and on social media would continue to repeat the baseless
74

See David Atkins, The Conspiracy Theories A Conservative Must Believe
Today, WASH. MONTHLY (Nov. 10, 2019), https://washingtonmonthly.com/2019/1
1/10/the-conspiracy-theories-a-republican-must- believe-today/.
75
See, e.g., Erik Maulbetsch, Candidates to Lead CO Republican Party
Embrace Election Conspiracy Theories, COLO. TIMES RECORDER (Jan. 28, 2021),
https://coloradotimesrecorder.com/2021/01/candidates-to-lead-co-republican-partyembrace-election-conspiracy-theories/34091/.
76
Michael Balsamo, Disputing Trump, Barr Says No Widespread Election
Fraud, AP NEWS (Dec. 1, 2020) https://apnews.com/article/barr-no-widespreadelection-fraud-b1f1488796c9a98c4b1a9061a6c7f49d; Durkee, supra note 71; Tim
Reid, Former Head of U.S. Election Security Calls Trump Team Fraud Allegations
“Farcical”, REUTERS (Nov. 27, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usaelection-krebs-idUSKBN28801G; Nick Corasaniti, et al., The Times Called Officials
in Every State, No Evidence of Voter Fraud, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2020)
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/10/us/politics/voting-fraud.html.
77
Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, supra note 69.
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claims by Trump and his enablers in the Republican Party, first that
Democrats would steal, then that they had stolen, the election through a
massive scheme of voter fraud, vote flipping by electronic voting machines,
and other means of cheating throughout closely contested states, such as
Georgia, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Arizona.78 Despite public assurances
from top election officials—in states where Biden had narrowly won—that
the elections were safe, secure, and fraud-free and that the vote tallies were
accurate, despite similar assurances from Trump’s own appointees in the top
positions at CISA and the Department of Justice, despite multiple recounts
and official audits verifying the election results, despite dozens of failed
lawsuits seeking to overturn the election results without credible evidence of
fraud or inaccurate vote tallies—despite all of this—Trump, his media allies,
and his political supporters in federal and state public office continued to
propagate the conspiracy theory (or, more accurately, to an inchoate
collection of disparate but occasionally overlapping conspiracy theories)
advancing the false assertion that Trump, not Biden, was the legitimate
winner of the 2020 presidential election.79 This assertion, in turn, ignited the
“Stop the Steal” social media campaign, hawked extensively by Trump and
his political allies, which called for Trump supporters to march on the U.S.
Capitol on January 6, 2021, and stop the official counting of the electoral
votes as the only way to “save” the country.80
The messaging adopted around the 2020 “Stop the Steal” campaign
mirrored the narrative adopted by Trump and his political surrogates four
years earlier, during the 2016 presidential campaign, when he began
declaring in the summer leading up to the election that the only way he would

78

See, e.g., Reality Check Team, US election 2020: Fact-checking Trump
Team’s Main Fraud Claims, BBC NEWS (Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/ne
ws/election-us-202055016029; Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, supra note 69.
79
Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, supra note 69; Madeline
Peltz, et al., On YouTube, The Epoch Times Promoted “Stop the Steal” Events and
Spread Misinformation Before and After Capitol Riots, MEDIA MATTERS (Jan. 26,
2021), https://www.mediamatters.org/epoch-times-and-ntd/youtube-epoch-timespromoted-stop-steal-events-and-spread-misinformation-and; Brian Fung & Donie
O’Sullivan, “Stop the Steal” Groups Hide in Plain Sight on Facebook, CNN
(Jan. 15, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/15/tech/facebook-stop-the-stealevasion/index.html; Nick Robins-Early, Fox News’ Biggest Hosts Go Full Election
Conspiracy For Trump, HUFFPOST (Nov. 6, 2020), https://www.huffpost.com/entry
/fox-news-election-trump-hannity_n_5fa5b864c5b64c88d400747f.
80
Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, supra note 69.
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lose is if his opponent, Democrat Hillary Rodham Clinton, were to cheat.81
Amidst constant claims that the 2016 election was “rigged” against Trump,
other, more lurid conspiracy theories abounded, as well, some of which were
amplified (and perhaps originated with) online Russian operatives.82 One
conspiracy claimed that the murder of a staffer for the Democratic National
Convention, Seth Rich, was a professional hit job orchestrated by Clinton.83
Another, dubbed “Pizzagate”, spread spurious allegations of a child sextrafficking ring headed by Clinton and operated from the basement of a pizza
restaurant in Washington, D.C.84

81

Id. In fact, Trump’s close ally and advisor Roger Stone had first employed the
phrase even earlier to defend Trump’s Republican primary victory. Michael Edison
Hayden, Far Right Resurrects Roger Stone’s #StopTheSteal During Vote Count,
SOUTHERN POVERTY L. CTR (Nov. 6, 2020), https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/
2020/11/06/far-right-resurrects-roger-stones-stopthesteal-during-vote-count.
82
Salvador Hernandez, Russian Trolls Spread Baseless Conspiracy Theories
Like Pizzagate and QAnon After the Election, BUZZFEED NEWS (Aug. 15, 2018),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/salvadorhernandez/russian-trolls-spreadbaseless-conspiracy-theories-like.
83
Colleen Shalby, How Seth Rich’s Death Became an Internet Conspiracy
Theory, THE LOS ANGELES TIMES (May 24, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/busin
ess/hollywood/la-fi-ct-seth-rich-conspiracy-20170523-htmlstory.html (“Two weeks
before the Democratic National Convention in July, Democratic National Committee
staffer Seth Rich was shot and killed in his Washington neighborhood. His family
and Metropolitan D.C. police have said his death was the result of a botched robbery.
But conspiracy theories have circulated in right-wing and conservative social and
news media spheres fueling unsubstantiated rumors that Rich’s killing was political
in nature.”). For a description of how the conspiracy theory spread, see Jeff Guo, The
Bonkers Seth Rich Conspiracy Theory, Explained, VOX (May 24, 2017),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/5/24/15685560/seth-richconspiracy-theory-explained-fox-news-hannity. See also Nicole Hemmer, Sean
Hannity Isn’t a Leader. He’s Just a Fan of Powerful Republicans, THE WASHINGTON
POST (Apr. 20, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/sean-hannity-isnta-leader-hes-just-a-fan-of-powerful-republicans/2018/04/20/7d3397cc-43f9-11e88569-26fda6b404c7_story.html (Reporting that for several weeks during 2017, Fox
News host Sean Hannity “propagated the strange conspiracy that Hillary Clinton’s
campaign was somehow responsible for the death of Democratic National
Committee staffer Seth Rich, which naturally piqued Trump’s interest.”).
84
Joshua Gillin, How Pizzagate Went from Fake News to a Real Problem for a
D.C. Business, POLITIFACT (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.politifact.com/article/2016/
dec/05/how-pizzagate-went-fake-news-real-problem-dc-busin/ (“Fake news became
all too real over the weekend after a North Carolina man entered a Washington
pizzeria with an assault rifle in an attempt to ‘self-investigate’ a false but persistent
conspiracy theory about Hillary Clinton. The baseless theory is that the business was
a front for a child sex ring run by Hillary Clinton and her campaign manager.”).

648

U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y

[Vol. XV No. 2

In both elections, the disinformation campaigns and conspiracy
theories propagated by Trump and his domestic allies found inauthentic
amplification by foreign-sourced bots and trolls on social media.85 In addition
to creating and boosting conspiracy theories, in 2016, the Russian
government, using intelligence agents, proxies, and cutouts, sought to assist
Trump’s campaign by secretly hacking into the Democratic National
Committee’s servers, stealing Clinton’s emails, and releasing them to the
public through WikiLeaks.86 On several occasions, Trump and his campaign
openly used social and traditional media to encourage these efforts. At a press
conference in July 2016, five days after WikiLeaks had released the first
batch of hacked emails, Trump responded to a reporter’s question about
possible Russian interference in the election by effectively inviting more of
it, when, in reference to missing emails from Clinton’s server, he stated:
“Russia, if you’re listening, I hope you’re able to find the 30,000 emails that
are missing. I think you will probably be rewarded mightily by our press.”87
During the final weeks before the election, between October 10 and
November 4, 2016, Trump repeatedly promoted the WikiLeaks dumps at his
campaign rallies, proclaiming his “love” for WikiLeaks on more than one
occasion.88 He also used social media platforms to do the same. For example,
a few days after WikiLeaks released a tranche of the DNC-hacked emails
written by Clinton’s Chief of Staff, John Podesta, Trump posted the
85

Hernandez, supra note 82 (describing amplification and sourcing of
conspiracy theories in the lead-up to the 2016 election); Joseph Menn, Russianbacked Organizations Amplifying QAnon Conspiracy Theories, Researchers Say,
REUTERS (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-qanonrussia/russian-backed-organizations-amplifying-qanon-conspiracy-theoriesresearchers-say-idUSKBN25K13T (“Russian government-supported organizations
are playing a small but increasing role amplifying conspiracy theories promoted by
QAnon, raising concerns of interference in the November [2020] U.S. election.”).
86
Duncan B. Hollis, Russia and the DNC Hack: What Future for a Duty of NonIntervention?, OPINIO JURIS (July 25, 2016), http://opiniojuris.org/2016/07/25/russi
a-and-the-dnc-hack-a-violation-of-the-duty-of-non-intervention/ (“U.S. officials
and certain cybersecurity experts . . . have concluded Russian government agencies
bear responsibility for hacking the Democratic National Committee’s servers and
leaking internal emails stored on them to WikiLeaks…”).
87
Quoted in David A. Graham, Trump’s Call for Russian Hacking Makes Even
Less Sense After Mueller, ATLANTIC (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2019/03/reviewing-trumps-call-russian-hacking-aftermueller/585838/.
88
David Choi and John Haltiwanger, 5 Times Trump Praised WikiLeaks During
His 2016 Election Campaign, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.businessi
nsider.com/trump-WikiLeaks-campaign-speeches-julian-assange-2017-11.
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following message on his Twitter account: “I hope people are looking at the
disgraceful behavior of Hillary Clinton as exposed by WikiLeaks. She is unfit
to run.”89 In a subsequent Twitter post a day later, he raised the specter of
election fraud, stating: “Very little pick-up by the dishonest media of
incredible information provided by WikiLeaks. So dishonest! Rigged
system!”90 Trump continued promoting the WikiLeaks releases, using them
to elevate the “rigged election” theme throughout the final weeks of the
campaign, even though no evidence existed to support his claim, even though
cybersecurity experts and the U.S. government had concluded that
WikiLeaks was working in concert with Russian intelligence, and even
though the CIA had briefed Trump that the emails released by WikiLeaks
came from the Russian hack of the DNC server.91
The extent to which Trump and his close circle knew that they were
adopting and advancing tactics and narratives that were part of a foreign
disinformation campaign remains unclear, but their conduct during the 2016
election, in light of public information and reported private briefings from
U.S. intelligence connecting Russia to the hacks and leaks, and the lack of
candor—indeed, the outright obstruction—by Trump and his campaign aides
during the various investigations seeking to understand the Kremlin’s role in
attacking the integrity of the 2016 U.S. presidential election, raises legitimate
89

Quoted in Max Kutner, Did Trump Know About Democratic Email Theft?
Full Timeline of President's WikiLeaks Comments, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 1, 2018),
https://www.newsweek.com/trump-WikiLeaks-comments-timeline-dnc-hackingmueller-824898.
90
Id.
91
For an excellent and detailed explanation of Russia’s hacking operation and
its reliance on WikiLeaks to release the stolen emails, see Thomas Rid, How Russia
Pulled Off the Biggest Election Hack in U.S. History, ESQUIRE (Oct. 20, 2016),
https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a49791/russian-dnc-emails-hacked/. For his
part, well after the 2016 election, President Barack H. Obama sought to draw public
attention to the malign foreign operations, describing the hacking and release of DNC
emails as a breach of “established international norms of behavior.” Press Release,
Statement by President on Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity
and Harassment, THE WHITE HOUSE, OFF. PRESS SEC’Y (Dec. 29, 2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/29/statementpresident-actions-response-russian-malicious-cyber-activity
[https://perma.cc/T6UC-6K2Z]. A Senate Intelligence Committee Report released in
February 2020 noted that President Obama had failed to act more aggressively before
the election—while the foreign interference was ongoing—because of his concerns
that his response would be perceived as motivated by political considerations rather
than concerns about protecting the nation’s election security. S. REP. NO. 116-290,
vol. 3 at 19 (2020).
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concerns.92 This is especially so given Trump’s unwillingness to admit that
Russia had interfered on his behalf (despite the intelligence community’s
high degree of confidence in attributing the interference to Russia), his
unexplained personal affinity for Russian President Vladimir Putin, and his
continued use of disinformation and conspiracy theories throughout his four
years in office in service of his own political fortunes.93

92

For example, on August 21, 2016, just a few weeks before WikiLeaks started
releasing Podesta’s stolen emails, Roger Stone, one of Trump’s close advisors,
posted the following—at the time, cryptic—statement on Twitter: “Trust me, it will
soon be Podesta’s time in the barrel.” Quoted in Emily Shultheis, John Podesta
Suggests Trump Camp Had Warning of WikiLeaks Hack, CBS NEWS (Oct. 12, 2016),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/john-podesta-suggests-trump-campaign-mayhave-had-advanced-warning-of-WikiLeaks-hack/. Although Stone denied that he
had any involvement or forewarning about the leaks, a federal criminal indictment,
on which Stone was subsequently convicted for witness tampering, making false
statements, and obstruction, alleged, in part:
a. On multiple occasions, STONE told senior Trump Campaign
officials about materials possessed by Organization 1 and the
timing of future releases.
b. On or about October 3, 2016, STONE wrote to a supporter
involved with the Trump Campaign, “Spoke to my friend in
London last night. The payload is still coming.”
c. On or about October 4, 2016, STONE told a high-ranking
Trump Campaign official that the head of Organization 1 had
a “[s]erious security concern” but would release “a load every
week going forward.”
Indictment at 17, United States v. Roger Jason Stone, Jr., No. 1:19-cr-00018-ABJ
(D.C. Cir. Jan. 24, 2019). In addition, earlier in the campaign, Trump’s eldest son,
Donald Trump, Jr., had expressed an enthusiastic willingness to meet with a person
described to him as a Russian government official who had incriminating evidence
about Clinton to share with him and that the information was “part of Russia and its
government's support for Mr. Trump,” by replying, “If it’s what you say I love it
especially later in the summer.” Quoted in Andrew Rafferty, Trump Jr. Emails: ‘I
Love It’ When Offered Russian Info on Clinton, NBC NEWS (July 11, 2017),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/trump-jr-tweets-his-emails-ledrussia-meeting-n781736.
93
Graham, supra note 87. These concerns are particularly salient for purposes
of this Article because of the questions they raise regarding international law
development in light of Trump’s liberal use of the presidential pardon power to
pardon, among others tied to Russia’s election meddling, Roger Stone and Paul
Manafort, both of whom had refused to cooperate with federal prosecutors
investigating Trump’s role in Russia’s interference in the 2016 election. See Doha
Madani, Trump Pardons Roger Stone, Paul Manafort, Charles Kushner and Others,
NBC NEWS (Dec. 23, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politicsnews/trump-pardons-roger-stone-paul-manafort-charles-kushner-others-n1252307.
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Four years later, by the time the 2020 presidential election results
were counted, the willingness of Trump and his political allies to spread
Russian disinformation could not be attributed to ignorance about its purpose
or provenance. The farther into Trump’s tenure in office, the more difficult
it became to distinguish the disinformation campaigns that originated with
foreign governments and were advanced by domestic political actors from
the disinformation campaigns that originated with domestic political actors
and were advanced by foreign governments. At some point, it seems the goals
of both seemed to align.94 The still-thriving “QAnon” conspiracy offers a
compelling illustration.95 According to the Soufan Center, an independent,
non-profit organization studying global security, QAnon is a “far-right
conspiratorial movement that creates and co-opts ‘theories’ to fit an evolving
narrative underpinned by the core notion that the ‘Deep State’, led by a cabal
94

Increasingly, historians, political scientists, national security experts, and
other experts on authoritarian regimes are sounding the alarm that Trump and the
Republican Party are willing to dismantle U.S. democracy to secure and remain in
power, which parallels the ultimate goal of the Kremlin. See, e.g., Lois Beckett,
Scholars Warn of Collapse of Democracy as Trump v Biden Election Looms,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 1, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/01/demo
cracy-fascism-global-trump-biden-election; Nancy LeTourneau, Authoritarianism
and the Identity Politics of the Republican Party, WASH. MONTHLY (Apr. 9,
2018), https://washingtonmonthly.com/2018/04/09/authoritarianism-and-theidentity-politics-of-the-republican-party/; Ivana Kottasova, US Republicans Are
Starting to Look a Lot Like Authoritarian Parties in Hungary and Turkey, Study
Finds, CNN (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/26/world/republicanparty-more-illiberal-study-intl/index.html; Christopher Ingraham, GOP Leaders’
Embrace of Trump’s Refusal to Concede Fits Pattern of Rising Authoritarianism,
Data Shows, WASH. POST (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/busin
ess/2020/11/12/republican-party-trump-authoritarian-data/; John Haltiwanger,
Republicans Are Putting America’s Democracy in Mortal Danger, More than 100
Scholars Warn, BUS. INSIDER (June 1, 2021), https://www.businessinsider.com/usdemocracy-danger-gop-voting-restrictions-over-100-scholars-warn-2021-6; HARV.
KENNEDY SCH., supra note 71.
95
See AP, Lies, Disinformation and Conspiracy Theories are Increasingly Being
Embraced as Acceptable Political Strategy, AP INVESTIGATION FINDS (Feb. 26,
2021), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/lies-disinformation-and-conspiracytheories-are-increasingly-being-embraced-as-acceptable-political-strategy-apinvestigation-finds-01614394986; Zachary Cohen, China and Russia “Weaponized”
QAnon Conspiracy Around Time of US Capitol Attack, Report Says, CNN (Apr. 19,
2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/19/politics/qanon-russia-chinaamplification/index.html (describing QAnon as “a sprawling far-right conspiracy
theory that promotes the absurd and false claim that former President Donald Trump
has been locked in a battle against a shadowy cabal of Satan-worshipping pedophiles
made up of prominent Democratic politicians and liberal celebrities.”).

652

U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y

[Vol. XV No. 2

of elitist pedophiles, is leading the United States.”96 As Trump and his
political supporters and allies have promoted QAnon narratives for the “Stop
the Steal” campaign, so, too, have foreign adversaries, such as Russia and
China, incorporated QAnon-narratives into their disinformation campaigns
aimed at “susceptible audiences in the United States and beyond.”97
Furthermore, with few exceptions, the entire political party that had
supported Trump throughout his tenure in office has joined him in
propagating disinformation and conspiracy theory campaigns.98 Moreover,
like Trump, the party has embraced the lie that Biden’s electoral victory
resulted from massive voter fraud, and they propagated that lie for weeks,
and then months, eventually refusing to recognize Biden as the legitimate
winner, and, in many instances, echoing Trump’s calls to protect the integrity
of the nation’s elections and to “Stop the Steal.”99 Relying directly or
indirectly on “stolen election” conspiracy theories, 126 Republican
lawmakers signed an amicus brief,100 and seventeen Republican Attorneys
General signed a separate amicus brief,101 supporting a lawsuit brought by
Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton asking the United States Supreme Court
to overturn the results of the 2020 presidential race in Pennsylvania, Georgia,
Michigan, and Wisconsin.102 Worse, on the basis of the false fraud allegations

96

The Soufan Center, Special Report: Quantifying the Q Conspiracy: A DataDriven Approach to Understanding the Threat Posed by QAnon 1, 8 (2021),
https://thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/TSC-WhitePaper_QAnon_16April2021-final-1.pdf.
97
Id.; See AP, supra note 95; Cohen, supra note 95.
98
See Atkins, supra note 74.
99
See, e.g., Sam Levine, How Republicans Came to Embrace the Big Lie of a
Stolen Election, THE GUARDIAN (June 13, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2021/jun/13/republicans-big-lie-us-election-trump; Chris Cillizza, 88% of
House and Senate Republicans Refuse to Publicly Acknowledge the Obvious: Joe
Biden Won, CNN (Dec. 7, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/07/politics/donaldtrump-joe-biden-2020-election/index.html.
100
Mot. for Leave to File Br. Amicus Curiae and Br. Of Amicus Curiae U.S.
Representative Mike Johnson and 125 Other Members of the U.S. House of
Representatives in Supp. Of Pl.[’s] Mot. For Leave to File a Bill of Compl. And Mot.
For a Prelim. Inj., Texas v. Pennsylvania, et al., 592 U.S. __ (2020) (No. 155).
101
Br. of State of Mo. and 16 Other States as Amici Curiae in Support of Pl.’s
Mot. for Leave to File Bill of Compl., Texas v. Pennsylvania, et al., No. 220551
(2020).
102
Mot. for Leave to File Bill of Compl., Texas v. Pennsylvania, et al., Doc.
220551, 592 U.S. ___ (2020). The Supreme Court denied the case for lack of
standing. Order in Pending Case, Texas v. Pennsylvania, et al., No. 155, Orig., Dec.
11, 2020, https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/121120zr_p860.pdf.
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perpetuated by Trump and his acolytes, dozens of Republican lawmakers in
both Houses of Congress voted against certifying the election results in key
states, despite the absence of any evidence that the election had been
fraudulently or otherwise illegitimately tipped in Biden’s favor, giving
further unjustified credence to the claims of their Party leader, who at the
time still occupied the Oval Office and wielded significant levers of
government power, that the election had been stolen from him.103
During the weeks after the election, a growing chorus of “Stop the
Steal” rallying cries gained traction among Trump supporters and
amplification from Trump himself.104 Trump’s election campaign funded and
organized a “Stop the Steal” rally to take place on the Capitol ellipse on
January 6, 2021, the same day that Congress was scheduled to perform what
has traditionally been the ministerial task of voting to approve each State’s
slate of electors, certifying the final election outcome.105 During a speech at
the rally, Trump called on his supporters to go to the Capitol to protest the
congressional vote.106 Following Trump’s cue, the rally-goers descended on
the Capitol.107 What had begun as a peaceful rally based on a conspiracy
theory and disinformation escalated over the course of the afternoon into a
violent insurrection based on a conspiracy theory and disinformation.108
Though the congressional vote resumed in the hours after the insurrectionists
had been subdued and dispersed, the violence that had interrupted the
proceedings resulted in multiple deaths and injuries; and though the attack
on the Capitol and those inside it was ultimately quelled, the conspiracy

103

Alvin Chang, The Long List of Republicans Who Voted to Reject Election
Results, GUARDIAN (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2021/jan/07/list-republicans-voted-to-reject-election-results;
John Bowden, The Republicans Who Voted to Challenge Election Results, HILL (Jan.
7, 2021), https://thehill.com/homenews/house/533076-read-the-republicans-whovoted-to-challenge-election-results.
104
Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, supra note 69.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id. Moreover, Republican lawmakers have embraced a host of new
conspiracy theories in the aftermath of the January 6 coup attempt, seeking to lay
blame for the violence at the Capitol on, in turns, Antifa, Black Lives Matter, and
even the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Alex Woodward, Republicans Blame FBI
for Capitol Riot in New Conspiracy, INDEPENDENT (June 16, 2021), https://www.in
dependent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/tucker-carlson-capitol-riotconspiracy-b1867375.html.
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theory that produced it has continued to gain momentum.109 As of this
writing, Trump has continued to peddle the falsehood that he was the
legitimate winner of the 2020 presidential election;110 congressional
Republicans—with only a handful of exceptions—have either embraced the
conspiracy theory that the election was stolen from Trump or have refused to
debunk it.111 In addition, State-level elected Republicans have authorized
unofficial “audits” of the vote tallies conducted by a private partisan
company with no auditing experience.112
109
Tara Subramaniam, Fact-checking Sidney Powell’s Claim Trump Could be
Reinstated, CNN (June 1, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/01/politics/powelltrump-inauguration-fact-check/index.html.
110
D.L. Davis, Déjà Vu All Over Again as Former President Trump Wrongly
Claims Wisconsin Victory, POLITIFACT (July 6, 2021), https://www.politifact.com/f
actchecks/2021/jul/06/donald-trump/deja-vu-all-over-again-former-presidenttrump-wron/; Matt Shuham, Trump Clings To Big Lie, Claims People Who Didn’t
Vote Stole Georgia Election, TALKING POINTS MEMO (June 23, 2021), https://talki
ngpointsmemo.com/news/trump-clings-to-big-lie-claims-people-who-didnt-votestole-georgia-election (“Former President Donald Trump continues to cling to the lie
that he won a second term in office, this time on the basis of several thousand soonto-be purged Georgians who didn’t vote in the 2020 presidential election.”).
111
Philip Bump, A Surreal, Submerged, Conspiratorial, Trump-Centered
Political Universe Still Thrives, WASH. POST (June 1, 2021), https://www.washingt
onpost.com/politics/2021/06/01/surreal-submerged-conspiratorial-trump-centeredpolitical-universe-still-thrives/ (observing that political rallies held by some
congressional Republicans advance “the same falsehood that Trump has worked to
promote since his ouster: that he didn’t lose [the presidential election] last year.”);
David Weigel, “Trump Won”: The Many Ways the GOP is Re-writing 2020, WASH.
POST (June 8, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/06/08/trailertrump-won-many-ways-gop-is-re-writing-2020/ (“As the year’s final state primaries
wrap up and the midterm campaign gets underway, Republicans have embraced
doubts about the 2020 election, and become more adamant about support for the
former president.”); Arden Farhi, et al., We Asked All 50 GOP Senators Whether
They Agree with Trump that He Won the Election. Only 5 Responded, CBS NEWS
(Feb. 19, 2021), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-election-republicansenators-5-respond/ (concluding that “the fact that [Senate Republicans] are not
speaking out even as Mr. Trump continues to claim he won the election – which the
majority of the Senate believes led to the armed insurrection — is a sign of the former
president’s enduring political clout.”).
112
Mia Jankowicz, Arizona GOP Official Blasts Company Carrying Out
Election Recount: “Insane Just From a Competence Standpoint”, BUS. INSIDER (Ju
ne 22, 2021), https://www.businessinsider.com/gop-official-blasts-insane-cyberninjas-arizona-audit-as-incompetent-2021-6; Amanda Carpenter, How the Arizona
Cyber Ninjas Audit Happened—In One Easy Step!, BULWARK (June 28, 2021),
https://thebulwark.com/how-the-arizona-cyber-ninjas-audit-happened-in-one-easystep/.
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The consequences of this groundless claim have proven dire for
American democracy. According to an April 2021 Reuters/Ipsos poll, more
than half of Republican voters wrongly believe that the election was stolen
from Trump and that voter fraud or election rigging resulted in Biden’s
win.113 As of June 2021, nearly half of Republican voters believe that State
legislatures should have the power to declare the winner of an election, even
if doing so would overturn the election results that are based on the popular
vote count.114 None of this bodes well for the long-term health and survival
of the American republic, but it does cheer America’s anti-democratic
adversaries. The use of cyber-operations to generate or boost conspiracy
theories and disinformation campaigns for the purpose of influencing
democratic popular opinion-making has proven an effective tool in the hands
of malign foreign governments,115 especially in situations where a domestic
government leader is willing to invite or accept them (and possibly later to
adopt similar tactics against the domestic population). As illustrated by the
“Stop the Steal” campaign, such activities pose a number of questions about
how they should be treated under international law, and the willingness of a
domestic head of State to amplify foreign-sourced conspiracy theories and
disinformation only creates additional complications.
The genesis of the “Stop the Steal” conspiracy theory and related
disinformation remains unclear. Although, at present, no evidence directly
implicates the Russian government, Trump advisor Roger Stone began
peddling the stolen election narrative in the run-up to the 2016 presidential
election, and Trump quickly adopted it, falsely claiming that the only way
his opponent could win was if the election were rigged.116 What is
113
Enten, supra note 70 (reporting poll results finding that “55% of Republicans
falsely believe Joe Biden’s victory in the 2020 presidential election was the result of
illegal voting or rigging [and] 60% of Republicans incorrectly agree that the election
was stolen from Republican Donald Trump.”).
114
Lee Drutman, Theft Perception Examining the Views of Americans Who
Believe the 2020 Election was Stolen, DEMOCRACY FUND VOTER STUDY GROUP
(June 2021), https://www.voterstudygroup.org/publication/theft-perception.
115
See discussion supra Part II.A. For another potent example, see JANKOWICZ,
supra note 14, at 123-535 (describing successful Russian cyber-based disinformation
campaign to persuade Dutch voters to vote no in a referendum on admitting Ukraine
to the European Union).
116
Hayden, supra note 81. Also noteworthy is the early adoption of the 2020
“Stop the Steal” campaign and its propagation on social media by Jack Posobiec, a
“far-right” commentator on social media, who also works as a correspondent for One
America News Network (“OANN”), see Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic
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noteworthy about Roger Stone’s early promulgation of this particular
conspiracy theory in 2016 is the similar role he played in promoting the
emails that Russia exfiltrated from the Democratic National Convention’s
servers and subsequently released through WikiLeaks in 2020.117 Because of
that role and his contacts with “Guccifer 2.0” (the persona claiming
responsibility for the DNC hack), the Department of Justice Special Counsel,
which was appointed to determine whether Trump or individuals associated
with his 2016 presidential campaign had coordinated with Russian
government officials or cutouts to facilitate Russia’s interference with the
2016 election, investigated Stone’s contacts and communications, and
determined that Stone had lied to Congress about his contacts and had failed
to turn over relevant documents.118 Stone was subsequently indicted and
convicted for obstructing a congressional investigation, making false
statements to Congress, and tampering with a witness.119 Trump
subsequently pardoned Stone.120 The through-line of Roger Stone acting as
both a close advisor to Trump and as a “Stop the Steal” propagator in both
the 2016 and 2020 elections, Stone’s contacts with Guccifer 2.0, and his
willingness to mislead Congress in its Russia election interference
investigation reasonably raise questions about whether Trump himself
knowingly promoted a Russian-sourced disinformation campaign.
The through-line of Roger Stone’s role in both election campaigns
also underscores some of the ambiguities existing under international law
with respect to a foreign government’s use of information warfare in the form
Research Lab, supra note 69, which also employs a known Russian-state reporter
and is known to advance the Kremlin’s disinformation and other propaganda, see
Kevin Poulsen, Trump’s New Favorite Channel Employs Kremlin-Paid Journalist,
THE DAILY BEAST (July 22, 2019), https://www.thedailybeast.com/oan-trumps-newfavorite-channel-employs-kremlin-paid-journalist?ref=scroll (commenting that
OANN has become “increasingly dedicated to conspiracy theories and fake news,
and became overtly supportive of Russia’s global agenda”); see also Kevin Poulsen,
Trump’s New Favorite Network Embraces Russian Propaganda, THE DAILY BEAST
(May 3, 2019), https://www.thedailybeast.com/trumps-new-favorite-network-oannembraces-russian-propaganda.
117
Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, supra note 69.
118
Robert S. Mueller III, Opinion, Roger Stone Remains a Convicted Felon, and
Rightly So, WASH. POST (July 11, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinion
s/2020/07/11/mueller-stone-oped/?arc404=true.
119
Indictment at 17, United States v. Roger Jason Stone, Jr., No. 1:19-cr-00018ABJ (D.C.Cir. Jan. 24, 2019); Ali Dukakis & Lucien Bruggeman, Roger Stone
Found Guilty on All 7 Counts, ABC (Nov. 15, 2019), https://abcnews.go.com/Politi
cs/roger-stone-found-guilty-counts/story?id=67015102.
120
Madani, supra note 93.
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of conspiracy theories and disinformation campaigns to influence democratic
opinion-making by the polity of another State when the target country’s head
of State remains silent in the face of such information warfare or even
actively amplifies it in concert with the hostile foreign government.121 These
ambiguities would likely be exacerbated if the silence of, or amplification by,
the target state’s head of government were corruptly or complicitly obtained
by the hostile State. For example, assuming arguendo, that the “Stop the
Steal” campaign is of Russian origin and that Trump knew that fact when he
perpetuated it, both in 2016 and in 2020, then the following questions
implicating international law arise: first, whether Trump, after assuming
office in January 2017, effectively ratified Russia’s interference with U.S.
democratic opinion-making in the 2016 election because he had previously
welcomed the conduct and refused to disavow it later; and second, whether
Trump in 2020 effectively (if not actually) consented to Russian cyber
operations on his behalf to promote the “Stop the Steal” campaign.
The point here is not to determine whether “Stop the Steal” in either
its 2016 or (perhaps especially) its 2020 incarnation was, in fact, a tactic in
Russia’s ongoing information warfare against the United States and other
western democracies, or whether Trump and his associates have knowingly
amplified or invited Russian disinformation into the United States electoral
discourse. Rather the purpose of the foregoing discussion is to lay the
groundwork for exploring the implications for the development of customary
international law in situations involving a target State’s failure to respond to
a hostile State’s cyber intrusion into the target State’s democratic opinionmaking processes because the target State’s head of government has
corruptly or complicitly consented to the intrusion.

III.

THE PERTINENT INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORK

The use of cyber operations as a means of conducting information
warfare is a relatively recent phenomenon, creating the need for
governments, practitioners, scholars, and other international law experts to
navigate a range of novel issues in international law and its application. The
foregoing discussion suggests a number of discrete legal issues that may arise
under international law. Among them are which international law norms and
principles should apply to cyber activities broadly; which international law
norms and principles, if any, should apply to cyber activities at the more
specific level of information warfare designed to manipulate the voting
121

See infra, Parts III and IV.
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behavior of another State’s population (e.g., using cyberspace to promote
conspiracy theories and disinformation campaigns); and how, if at all, the
international law framework, as applied to cyber-based information warfare,
should account for the role that corruption or kompromat may play in
enabling a perpetrating State to secure the cooperation of a target State’s
government head (or other organ of the government) in creating or
amplifying the foreign State’s information warfare. This Part reviews
applicable international law principles relating to these questions, including
both the background and the current status of those principles as applied to
cyber-based activities generally and to online operations targeting voter
opinion-making and political preferences. Though the basics are now mostly
agreed upon, many core issues remain unsettled, and some peripheral issues
have yet to appear on the horizon.
As a preliminary matter, the application of international law to states’
cyber-based activities is widely accepted.122 Specifically, the international
community appears to have reached consensus that the international law
principles of sovereignty and non-interference apply to states’ cyber
activities.123 As early as 2013, the United Nations Group of Government
122
HARRIET MOYNIHAN, THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO STATE
CYBERATTACKS: SOVEREIGNTY AND NON-INTERVENTION, 4 (Dec. 2019),
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/12/application-international-law-statecyberattacks (“States have agreed that international law, including the principles of
sovereignty and non-intervention, does apply to states’ activities in cyberspace.”).
123
Id. at 8. The international legal framework offers a number of possible
approaches for dealing with activities conducted in cyberspace, including
information warfare, more generally. One option would be to treat cyber activities
that utilize information warfare in the same way that it treats peacetime espionage,
which treatment largely leaves any imposed penalties to the domestic law of the
targeted State. Jens David Ohlin, Did Russian Cyber Interference in the 2016
Election Violate, International Law?, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1579, 1582-83 (2017) (noting
the consensus opinion that espionage violates domestic law, not international law).
Although several rules of international law would seem to forbid espionage, the
practice is so widely employed that a consensus among scholars has emerged that
customary international law has created a new norm permitting it. MOYNIHAN, supra
note 122, at 45 (observing that “in the non-cyber context, the majority position
among commentators is that with the exception of certain rules, espionage is largely
left unregulated by international law and as such is not prohibited by international
law per se”). Some scholars reject the conclusion that customary international law
has coalesced around a permissive structure for peacetime espionage. See Inaki
Navarrete and Russell Buchan, Out of the Legal Wilderness: Peacetime Espionage,
International Law and the Existence of Customary Exceptions, 51 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 897, 912-14 (2019) (arguing, contrary to prevailing opinion, that such a norm
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Experts (UNGGE) reported agreement among states that, pursuant to the
principles of the United Nations Charter, states must observe the principle of
sovereignty regarding jurisdiction over infrastructure for information and
communications technology that is located within a State’s territory and
regarding states’ cyber-related activities.124 The 2013 UNGGE report
likewise concluded that international norms and principles flowing from
sovereignty also apply to states’ cyber-related activities.125 One such
principle deriving from sovereignty is the principle of non-intervention.126
Beyond this baseline agreement, however, the particulars of how
international law applies to cyber activities are unresolved, resulting in
ambiguities relating to states’ legal rights and obligations in the cyber
does not, in fact, exist because much of the conduct characterized as peacetime
espionage is conducted surreptitiously and therefore cannot meet the State practice
requirement for establishing customary international law). Under this approach,
cyber operations, like espionage, would be subject to sanction only if they violated
some domestic law of the target rather than being treated as “internationally unlawful
per se.” MOYNIHAN, supra note 122. If this approach were taken, however, it would
require justification for enveloping cyber operations into definitions and conceptions
of espionage currently in place in international law; otherwise, this approach would
require a wait-and-see posture to allow customary international law to develop (or
not) cyber norms similar to those governing non-cyber espionage. See Id. at 46-47
(arguing that cyber espionage activities should be evaluated individually to
determine whether they violate other binding norms under international law). A
second option would be to develop new international rules and principles designed
specifically for cyberspace, including the use of cyberspace for conducting
information warfare. Id. at 7. Based upon the premise that cyber activities present
unique circumstances and challenges, this approach presumes that the existing
principles and norms governing international law cannot properly address the ranges
of issues at play in the cyber context. At present, however, international law experts
have opted for a third approach, reaching the general consensus that the current
international law framework can adequately accommodate emerging cyber-related
issues, including information warfare conducted in cyberspace, without creating
new, cyber-specific rules or treating them as functionally equivalent to peacetime
espionage. Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, Respect for Sovereignty in Cyberspace,
95 TEX. L. REV. 1639, 1639 n. 3 (2017) (“There appears to be near-universal
consensus that the extant international law governs cyber activities.”). This approach
could still ultimately allow for treating cyber activities in the same way as espionage,
but the trend is not currently flowing in that direction.
124
Rep. of the Group of Governmental Experts on Devs. in the Field of Info.
and Telecomm. in the Context of Int’l Security, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. A/68/98 (2013).
125
Id. ¶ 20. These conclusions were also reiterated in the UNGGE 2015 Report.
Rep. of the Group of Governmental Experts on Devs. in the Field of Info. and
Telecomm. in the Context of Int’l Security, ¶¶ 27-28, U.N. Doc. A/70/174 (2015).
126
Rep. of the Group of Governmental Experts on Devs. in the Field of Info.
and Telecomm. in the Context of Int’l Security, ¶ 28b, U.N. Doc. A/70/174 (2015).
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context.127 More specifically, the ways in which those principles are to be
applied to specific categories of State cyber conduct lack clarity, as does the
underlying predicate for what constitutes a violation justifying a right of
response.128 These issues become especially thorny when determining how
international law applies to the particular type of cyber activity under scrutiny
in this Article, namely a State’s cyber-based operations that propagate and
amplify conspiracy theories and disinformation campaigns targeting
democratic opinion-making in another State. They become even thornier if
the government leader of the target State remains silent and passive in the
face of such operations, and they become thornier still if the target State’s
silence and passivity have been corruptly obtained by the infringing State.
This Part provides a brief overview of the applicable international law
principles and the issues raised by their application to cyber-based
operations, including information warfare designed to affect the voting
behavior of another State’s populace, before the following two Parts discuss,
in turn, the difficulties that states’ silence pose for the development of
customary international law in this area, and the additional analytical
problems that may warrant consideration in instances where domestic
corruption motivates a State’s response to these kinds of foreign cyber
activities.

A. Applicable Principles: Sovereignty and Non-intervention
Within the widely accepted view that international law principles,
including the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, apply to cyber
activities broadly understood, uncertainty nonetheless exists, about which
principle or principles should apply to particular cyber activities. Some of
that uncertainty results from differences in conceptions about the principles
themselves. Some of it results from the nontraditional features of the cyber
activities. And some of it results from the still-developing nature of State
practice in response to hostile cyber operations conducted remotely. This
section considers the interplay between these sources of uncertainty.
127

MOYNIHAN, supra note 122, at 4. This is so in part because states have been
reluctant to make public their views on how international law precepts apply to cyber
operations, and cyber operations themselves are usually conducted surreptitiously,
making the drawing of reliable inferences difficult. Id. at 6; Barela, supra note 8
(“[W]hen it comes to cyberspace there are a host of difficulties for articulating the
precise application of international law. Agreement among States has been slow due
to the many new challenges posed by rapidly expanding networks of information and
communication technologies (ICTs).”).
128
MOYNIHAN, supra note 122, at 4.
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1. Sovereignty
Sovereignty is a principle of international law giving rise both to
rights that a State enjoys in relation to other states and to duties that a State
must fulfill in relation to other states.129 Under this principle, a State
possesses “the supreme authority . . . to territorial integrity, sovereign
equality and political independence within its territory to the exclusion of all
other states.”130 Major cases decided by international tribunals affirm these
aspects of sovereignty. For example, in the Corfu Channel case, in which the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) concluded, inter alia, that the United
Kingdom had violated the sovereignty of the Republic of Albania by
conducting minesweeping operations in Albanian territorial waters without
the consent of the Albanian government, the majority opinion stated:
“Between independent states, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential
foundation of international relations.”131 In a concurring opinion, Judge
Alvarez explained further: “By [sovereignty], we understand the whole body
of rights and attributes which a State possesses in its territory, to the
exclusion of all other states, and also in its relations with other states.”132
A different tribunal, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, deciding a
case in which the United States and the Netherlands laid conflicting claims
to the Island of Palmas (or Miangas), observed: “[T]erritorial sovereignty
belongs always to one, or in exceptional circumstances to several states, to
the exclusion of all others.”133 The right to exclude others is related to, but
distinct from, the sovereign right of political independence, which recognizes
a State’s sole authority to exercise “the functions of a State” within its
territory.134 Stated differently, “[t]erritorial sovereignty . . . involves the
exclusive right to display the activities of a State.”135

129

Memorial of United Kingdom, Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949
I.C.J. 43 (April 9) (separate opinion by Alvarez, J.) (“Sovereignty confers rights upon
States and imposes obligations on them.”).
130
MOYNIHAN, supra note 122 at 8.
131
Memorial of United Kingdom, Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949
I.C.J. 35 (April 9) (separate opinion by Alvarez, J.).
132
Id. at 43.
133
Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.), Hague Ct. Rep. 2d (Scott) 838 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 1928).
134
Id.
135
Id. at 839.
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When a State engages in cyber activities that do not involve the use
of force,136 the standard against which to measure whether such activities
violate international law—thereby triggering a right of response—is unclear,
but two broad approaches have emerged in the relevant legal commentary.137
Some commentators have taken the position that a State’s cyber activity
below the use of force violates international law and gives rise to a right of
response only if the intrusion runs afoul of the non-intervention principle.138
Those adhering to this philosophy view sovereignty in the cyber context as a
guiding principle that may inform states in their conduct relating to
cyberspace rather than as “a standalone rule” which itself may be violated.
In other words, if the requirements for a violation of the non-intervention
principle—including the requirement of coercion—are not met, then the
cyber activity in question does not violate international law.139 Other
commentators have taken the position that a State’s cyber intrusions need not
meet the non-intervention threshold to constitute an unlawful violation of the
target State’s sovereignty. On this view, sovereignty is a standalone primary
rule, the breach of which authorizes response by the target State under
international law.140
State practice regarding these two approaches remains in a state of
flux.141 The United States, for example, at one time appeared to adopt (or at
136
Article 2 of the United Nations Charter “prohibits the threat or use of force
and calls on all Members to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence of other States.” U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
137
Michael Schmitt, The Netherlands Releases a Tour de Force on International
Law in Cyberspace: An Analysis, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.just
security.org/66562/the-netherlands-releases-a-tour-de-force-on-international-lawin-cyberspace-analysis/ (describing disagreement among international law experts
and divergence in State practice on the question of whether sovereignty is itself “a
rule of law that . . . may be violated.”).
138
See Michael N. Schmitt, Grey Zones in the International Law of Cyberspace,
42 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1, 4-5 (2017) (explaining competing approaches to the
sovereignty principle).
139
See infra, Part II.A.2 for discussion of the coercion element.
140
See, e.g., Schmitt & Vihul, supra note 123 (arguing that “overwhelming
evidence of State practice and opinio juris–the foundational elements of customary
international law–supports the assertion” that sovereignty operates as a primary rule
rather than a guiding principle.).
141
MOYNIHAN, supra note 122, at 8-9 (explaining that states have opted for a
“‘policy of ambiguity and silence’” on this question. Id. at 9, quoting another source).
Moreover, no treaties are in place to fill the gap left by the decision of most states
not to “put on the record how they think these principles apply in practice.” Id. at 10
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least to be open to adopting) the “sovereignty as rule” approach when the
Department of Defense opined in 1999 that at least some cyber activities
undertaken by a State against another State could violate the target State’s
sovereignty, thereby constituting an “internationally wrongful act.”142 More
recently, the United States appears to have drifted toward the school of
thought that conceives of sovereignty in the cyber context as an underlying
principle to guide the establishment of binding norms rather than a rule of
international law that itself can be breached and thereby result in an
international obligation.143 Although the United Kingdom also tacks in the
same direction,144 the sovereignty-as-principle-only position runs counter to
the consensus of the international group of experts reported by the Tallinn
Manual 2.0, which adopted the “sovereignty-as-rule” approach to cyber
operations.145
The difference between these two approaches to sovereignty, that is,
between sovereignty-as-principle-only and sovereignty-as-rule, has
implications for how international law is to treat a foreign State’s cyber
operations that involve propagating conspiracy theories and disinformation
campaigns in a target State in an attempt to manipulate the target State’s
democratic decision-making. If sovereignty is a primary rule of international
law, then a remote cyber operation may violate sovereignty if the operation
either manifests on the territory of the target State or if it “interferes with or
usurps inherent governmental functions of [the target] state.”146 An example
of a territorial manifestation of a remotely conducted cyber operation
(noting the exception of the Council of Europe’s Budapest Convention, which covers
cybercrimes).
142
Schmitt & Vihul, supra note 123, at 1640.
143
Schmitt & Vihul, supra note 123, at 1640-42.
144
MOYNIHAN, supra note 122, at 8 and n. 28.
145
Schmitt & Vihul, supra note 123, at 1640-42 (“Tallinn Manual 2.0
accordingly provides in Rule 4 that ‘[a] State must not conduct cyber operations that
violate the sovereignty of another State.’”) Id. at 1642; see also Michael N. Schmitt,
Grey Zones in the International Law of Cyberspace, 42 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1,
5 (2017) (“This ‘sovereignty as principal, but not rule’ approach contradicts
extensive State practice and opinio juris in the non-cyber context, which treat the
prohibition as a primary rule, such that a violation of sovereignty would constitute
an internationally wrongful act.”).
146
Schmitt, supra note 137; Schmitt & Vihul, supra note 123, at 1649 (arguing
that cyber operations which interfere with or usurp a State’s inherently governmental
functions constitute a violation of sovereignty, regardless of whether such operations
cause damage or injury within the target State, and regardless of the infringing
State’s use of coercion). Elections are considered an inherently governmental
function. MOYNIHAN, supra note 122, at 40.
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constituting a violation of sovereignty is physical damage to the target State’s
infrastructure.147 An example of an inherent government function—that is, a
function that only states may undertake (or authorize other entities to
undertake)—is conducting elections.148 If sovereignty is only a guiding
principle, the violation of international law for conducting remote cyber
operations must be based upon some other principle that does constitute a
binding rule, such as the non-intervention principle.

2. Non-intervention
The non-intervention principle prohibits a State from intervening in
another State’s internal affairs, even when such intervention does not involve
the use of force.149 More precisely, it prohibits coercive conduct by one State
“in relation to the inherently sovereign powers of another state.”150 Like the
principle of sovereignty, the non-intervention principle has been affirmed in
multiple decisions by international tribunals. In 1986, the ICJ, for example,
observed in the Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) that “[t]he
principle of non-intervention involves the right of every sovereign State to
conduct its affairs without outside interference, [and] the Court considers that
it is part and parcel of customary international law.”151 Elaborating, the Court
continues:
A prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing
on matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle
of State sovereignty, to decide freely. One of these is the
choice of a political, economic, social and cultural system,
and the formulation of foreign policy. Intervention is
wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such
choices, which must remain free ones.152
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Despite “widespread consensus that a duty of non-intervention is customary
international law,” however, “the scope and substance of the duty remain
unclear.”153 This lack of clarity exists partly because coercion, while an
essential element of a violation of the non-intervention principle, does not
enjoy an accepted international law definition.154 Although the use of force
clearly constitutes coercive intervention, measures that do not reach the level
of force generate disagreement about where, and how, to draw the line
between the permissible, i.e., that conduct which falls on the “noncoercive”
side of the divide, and the impermissible, i.e., that conduct which falls on the
“coercive” side of the divide.155 Of course, how coercion is defined will
determine not only whether any given cyber operations violate the nonintervention principle, but also, by extension, whether the target State enjoys
a right of response under international law.156
Consider the following examples: One definition of coercion is
“compelling a state to take a course of action (whether an act or omission)
that it would not otherwise pursue.”157 Under this definition, the use of cyber
operations to influence the target State is distinguished from the use of cyber
operations to coerce the target State.158 The former, an example of which is
“a powerful social media campaign designed to affect elections”, does not
meet the standard established by the above definition of coercion and does
not, therefore, violate the non-intervention prohibition.159 The latter, an
example of which is the manipulation of election results, does meet the
standard for coercion under the above definition, and does, therefore, qualify
as impermissible intervention.160 Applying this definition to Russia’s hacking
of the DNC server and its exfiltration and release of internal emails stored on
those servers during the run-up to the 2016 presidential election with the
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purpose of harming one candidate and helping her opponent, Russia’s
conduct does not clearly qualify as coercive intervention.161
A second conception of coercion may be found in the 1970 U.N.
General Assembly Declaration on Friendly Relations Among States
regarding the duty of non-intervention, which provides: “Every State has an
inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social, and cultural
systems, without interference in any form by another State.”162 If a State’s
“interference in any form” with another State’s right to choose its political
system implicates the non-intervention principle, as some scholars have
argued, then the broad language used in the Declaration on Friendly
Relations would allow the element of coercion in the non-intervention
principle to be more readily satisfied.163 Applying this conception of coercion
to Russia’s conduct in the run-up to the 2016 presidential election, i.e., the
theft and release of the DNC’s internal emails designed to affect the choices
of the American voting public, would meet the standard for establishing a
breach of the non-intervention principle.164
For many commentators, two critical inquiries in the coercion
analysis as applied to cyber-based information campaigns designed to
161

Id. Some scholars have concluded that, though the question is close, Russia’s
conduct does meet the coercion requirement for purposes of the non-intervention
principle, even under the narrower definition of coercion. Schmitt, supra note 145,
at 8 (“Opinions vary as to whether the cyber operations were coercive in the
intervention sense. The emails that were released had not been altered, and it is
generally accepted that mere espionage, without more, is not unlawful under
international law. The opposing, and slightly sounder, view is that the cyber
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in a way that they otherwise would not have. In this sense, they were coercive.”).
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Declaration on Principles of Int’l Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Annex, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/25/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970) (emphasis added).
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See, e.g., Nicholas Tsagourias, Electoral Cyber Interference, SelfDetermination and The Principle of Non-Intervention in Cyberspace, THE
UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD, 1, 14 (2020), http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/159652/
(quoting JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 127
(2007)); Hollis, supra note 86.
164
As Professor Duncan Hollis observes, the broader articulation of
“interference in any form” provided by the Declaration on Friendly Acts potentially
encompasses a wider range of cyber operations targeting the democratic opinionmaking of another State’s polity, thereby implicating the duty of non-intervention,
especially if such operations are “designed to impact public support for . . . an entire
‘political’ party.” Hollis, supra note 86. See also Barela, supra note 8 (arguing for
an understanding of coercion that accounts for “[t]he significance and expanse, both
in scale and reach, of the interests targeted”).
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manipulate voting behavior are: (1) whether the information propagated is
factually accurate or disinformation; and (2) whether the foreign State is
conducting its operations covertly or overtly. If an operation involves
disinformation covertly promoted by a foreign State to affect the voting
behavior of another State’s polity, then “the attempt to manipulate the will of
the people” could constitute intervention because it “undermine[s] the target
State’s sovereign will over its choice of political system” by thwarting the
target State’s ability to hold free and fair elections.165 On this view, the
deception inherent in disinformation and covert action is key in that it
effectively operates as coercion by distorting the electoral discourse and
depriving the voting population of the “open democratic space in which to
conduct free and fair elections” and, by extension, to decide its political
system freely.166 Absent the deceptive nature of the cyber activity, the foreign
State’s conduct may be categorized as nothing more than an influence
campaign.167 As one commentator has stated: “In light of the growing
frequency of cyber operations implicating the prohibition, further
clarification by the international community of the threshold for intervention
is badly needed.”168

B. The Right to Self-Determination
A lesser discussed, but potentially potent, source for assessing the
permissibility of foreign-sourced cyber operations, particularly those which
attempt to influence a target State’s democratic opinion-making, is the right
to self-determination recognized under international law. The primary rule
for this analysis is the United Nations “Friendly Relations” Declaration,
which provides:

165
MOYNIHAN, supra note 122, at 41-42; see also Kate Jones, Online
Disinformation and Political Discourse: Applying a Human Rights Framework, 1,
32-37 (2019) (using a human rights framework to argue that “rights to freedom of
thought and opinion are critical to delimiting the appropriate boundary between
legitimate influence and illegitimate manipulation”).
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MOYNIHAN, supra note 122, at 42.
167
Id. at 42 (“[Official] statements that seek to steer another government’s
population on a matter may be perceived as propaganda but if they are open and
factually correct then they would be less likely to violate the principle of nonintervention because the target state would still have the free will to respond.”);
Schmitt, supra note 145, at 8 (“Coercion is accordingly more than mere influence. It
involves undertaking measures that deprive the target State of choice.”).
168
Schmitt, supra note 137.
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No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly
or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or
external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed
intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted
threats against the personality of the State or against its
political, economic and cultural elements, are in violation of
international law.169
Although a number of commentators view the right to self-determination in
connection with the non-intervention principle for purposes of determining
breach of international law,170 at least one scholar, drawing primarily on this
provision, contends that self-determination is, standing alone, the proper
concept for analyzing cyber operations that employ conspiracy theories and
disinformation campaigns propagated by foreign operatives.171 A key aspect
of the self-determination analysis, namely the role of deception in executing
the cyber operations, parallels certain core inquiries regarding the coercion
element under a non-intervention analysis.172 Dean Jens David Ohlin
explains how Russian operatives, by posing as Americans on social media in
an effort to sway [the 2016 presidential] election, deceived American voters,
“point[ing] the way to the distinctive harm of this type of election

169

Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation Among States, G.A. Re. 2625 (XXV), Annex, U.N. Doc.
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of non-intervention.”); MOYNIHAN, supra note 122, at 41 (“The right to selfdetermination, which refers to the right of peoples to determine freely and without
external interference their political status and to pursue freely their economic, social
and cultural development, is also relevant, and some have noted the link between
that right and the principle of non-intervention.”).
171
Ohlin, supra note 123, at 1595-1598 (2017) (arguing that the Russian social
media campaign violated the right to self-determination rather than the principles of
sovereignty and non-intervention); Jens David Ohlin, Election Interference: The
Real Harm and the Only Solution, CORNELL LAW SCHOOL LEGAL STUDIES
RESEARCH PAPER SERIES No. 18-50 (2018), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3276940.
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Jens David Ohlin, Election Interference: The Real Harm and the Only
Solution, Cornell Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 18-50 at 13
(2018), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3276940 (“[T]he covert nature of the election
interference was crucial to its illegality as a violation of the principle of selfdetermination.”).
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interference.”173 He argues that this deception enabled “individuals who were
not members of the polity” to “fundamentally alter[ ] the political discourse”
in the United States.174 These individuals distorted the political discourse by
“gain[ing] inside access to the political process and . . . amplify[ing]
[political] viewpoints that . . . were considered marginal and in many cases
outside the political mainstream.”175 According to Professor Ohlin, whether
the influence campaign changed the outcome of the election is immaterial:
The particular harm flowed from the fact that the Russians
participated in the electoral process while pretending to be
Americans. This had a distortionary impact on the electoral
process, which is problematic because an election is
supposed to articulate the view of the polity, i.e., a
fulfillment of that polity’s right of self-determination. Once
outsiders insert themselves into that process, while
pretending to be insiders, the election becomes a function of
other-determination rather than self-determination. The
election expresses the political will of outside entities rather
than the entity that is holding the election.176
A major difference the analysis under the self-determination
principle standing alone brings to the fore is the pertinent remedy. Election
interference by outsiders posing as insiders constituting violations of
sovereignty, or non-intervention, gives the affected State certain rights of
response. Traditionally, violations of international law accord a right of
response in four categories: retorsion, countermeasures, necessity, and selfdefense.177 Retorsion is a punitive or message-sending response taken by a
State in reaction to the conduct of another State.178 This response, some
examples of which include the imposition of economic sanctions, the
expulsion of diplomats, and the placement of visa restrictions, is considered
unfriendly, but it constitutes a lawful reaction.179 As applied to cyber
operations that violate international law, at least one country has stated its
position that retorsion may include limiting or severing the infringing State’s
access to the target State’s domestic servers or other infrastructure in its
173
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territory, consistent with any treaty obligations mandating such access.180
The second category, countermeasures, consist of acts or omissions that,
unless taken in response to another State’s unlawful actions, would
themselves be impermissible under international law.181 A target State may
take countermeasures only in response to an action by another State that is
itself impermissible under international law.182 In addition, countermeasures,
which may be cyber or non-cyber in nature, must not be disproportionate to
the harm caused by the other State, and they must not violate human rights
or obligations under diplomatic law.183 An example of a countermeasure that
a target State may take against an infringing State’s unlawful cyber activities
is the use of a counter cyber operation to disrupt or shut down the servers,
networks, or other infrastructure that the infringing State has used for its
unlawful cyber operations.184 Third, necessity as a response to internationally
wrongful conduct by another State consists of an otherwise unlawful action
undertaken when it is the only means for safeguarding an essential national
interest (such as the power grid, water supply, or banking system) against a
grave and imminent danger.185 A target State may engage in this category of
response only when the threat to essential national interest or interests is
immediate and the strict conditions for countermeasures cannot be met.186
The final category, self-defense, authorizes a target State to use force in
response to a cyber “armed attack”—that is, a cyber-attack which causes
fatalities, physical damage, and destruction akin to a kinetic armed attack.187
Absent such fatalities, physical damage, or destruction, consensus is lacking
about when a cyber-attack qualifies as an armed attack.
These traditional responses, available only after the fact, however,
do nothing to vindicate the principle of self-determination, once violated.188
In other words, “an ex post remedy is no solution at all to an infringement of
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the collective right of self-determination.”189 Accordingly, if cyber activities
by foreign governments (or their proxies) seeking to manipulate the voting
behavior of another State’s polity by posing as members of that polity are
deemed to be in violation of the self-determination principle, then the remedy
must lie outside the traditional framework of permissible responses for the
breach of other international law principles. According to Dean Ohlin, a State
subjected to violation of its right to self-determination by the insertion of
outsiders into its electoral process, instead of relying on the traditional
responses, has but one remedy: real-time exposure of the outsiders and their
interference.190 Only through transparency, that is, only by informing the
polity that certain information is being generated or amplified by individuals
or entities who are not members of the polity can the target population freely
determine the weight and relevance of the information being propagated.
This solution assumes, however, that the insiders who are in power
will want transparency—both as to the interfering conduct by outsiders and
as to the accuracy of the information being propagated. As the illustrations
from Poland’s Smolensk conspiracy theory and from the United States’ “Stop
the Steal” conspiracy theory suggest, however, the very real possibility exists
that some government leaders may not want such transparency, especially if
the conspiracy theory or disinformation being spread inures to their political
benefit.

IV.

WHY CLARITY MATTERS AND THE PROBLEMS THAT STATES’
SILENCE ENGENDERS

As hostile cyber operations—including the propagation of
conspiracy theories and disinformation—proliferate worldwide, clarity in the
international law rules governing cyberspace grows increasingly important
for at least two broad reasons. First, such clarity establishes the ground rules
for the cyber activities that a State may initiate lawfully, thereby promoting
stability, predictability, and consistency with respect to what cyber activities
are permissible and what activities are impermissible.191 Clear ground rules
function to deter impermissible activities, lower the risk of unintended
escalation, and enable robust responses to hostile cyber operations.192
189
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Second, a rules-based world order should expect and indeed require
unambiguous legal grounds for a State to be able to invoke a right to respond
to a cyber operation.193 In this regard, clarity concerning the specific elements
of consent and coercion is important because these elements form part of the
predicate for a targeted State’s permissible response options international
law.194
Despite the need for clarity, certain elements of sovereignty and noninterference remain opaque in the context of cyber-based information
warfare.195 Determining whether cyber operations by a State employing the
weaponized use of conspiracy theories and disinformation to manipulate
democratic opinion-making in another State violate international law may
depend, for example, on whether such operations are analyzed under the
principle of sovereignty, the principle of non-intervention, or the principle of
self-determination, or on whether the conduct is undertaken covertly or
overtly, or, for purposes of a non-intervention analysis, how the element of
coercion is defined.196 Nevertheless, although a few states have taken public
positions on how international law applies in cyberspace, most have
remained silent.197
States’ silence on their views concerning how international law
applies to cyberspace not only fails to provide the clarity needed for
distinguishing permissible cyber activities from impermissible, but it also
creates several additional potential problems. First, it depresses the
development of international law by failing to acknowledge that a State
believes to be an internationally lawful cyber operation or have reacted to
what the State believes to be an internationally wrongful cyber operation.198
The lack of public statements is particularly important when a target State
remains silent after becoming the victim of a publicly known cyber operation
by an infringing State. In this situation, the target State may in fact launch a
response (cyber or otherwise), but that response may be out of public view
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and unacknowledged by the target State.199 In other words, the lack of a
visible response does not necessarily mean the lack of an actual response.
Nevertheless, as some commentators have argued, a State’s secret conduct
does not qualify as State practice for purposes of customary international law
development.200 Accordingly, silence hampers the formation and
crystallization of customary international law concerning cyber activities.
Second, and relatedly, silence or failure to respond risks creating a
potentially false impression of consensus by the international community that
particular cyber operations, including practices of information warfare, are
internationally lawful and, therefore, risks prematurely crystallizing
limitations on permissible actions that target states may undertake in
response under customary international law.201 In other words, because
silence may function as a norm-creating force in the development of
customary international law, states may be unintentionally contributing to
new norms involving cyber behaviors by the mere choice of silence in
response to such behaviors.202 Customary international law has a long history
as a primary source of international law, and State practice in the
development of international law is of paramount importance.203 The statute
establishing the International Court of Justice as the “principal judicial organ
of the United Nations” specifically provides that, in adjudicating disputes,
the court shall apply “international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law.”204 As the United Nations International Law Commission
199
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201
Schmitt & Vihul, supra note 123, at 1647 (noting that, absent treaty
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customary international law).
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recently reaffirmed, the “existence and content of rules of customary
international law” consist of “two constituent elements [which must] be
separately ascertained.”205 First is the “requirement of general [State]
practice.”206 Second is the requirement “that the general practice be accepted
as law (opinio juris), mean[ing] that the practice in question must be
undertaken with a sense of legal right or obligation.”207 In other words, as
articulated by the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases:
Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled
practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such
a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e., the existence of
a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the
opinio juris sive necessitatis. The states concerned must
therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a
legal obligation.208
Given that the requirements for “crystallization”—that is, the formal
recognition of a rule or principle—of customary international law are State
practice and opinio juris,209 and given that the world is in the early days of
205
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cyber-based information warfare,210 the two elements remain
underdeveloped as applied to this particular area.211 Although a few states
have taken public positions regarding the application of international law
principles to cyberspace, most have not,212 and even fewer have done so with
specific reference to cyber activities employing conspiracy theories and
disinformation campaigns.213
Finally, silence or failure to respond risks allowing corrupt actors to
set the course of customary international law development in the emerging
application of international rules to cyberspace, even if only to delay it. In
this respect, the role of strategic corruption, that is, corruption “as an
instrument of national strategy” is relevant.214 Strategic corruption occurs
when “corrupt inducements are wielded against a target country by foreigners
as a part of their own country’s national strategy.”215 In an extreme
(hypothetical) scenario, a critical mass of State government heads could be
bribed, extorted, or otherwise compromised by another State to remain silent
and passive in response to cyber-based information-warfare campaigns to
sway the behavior of voters in the target states to elect political leaders who
will adopt policies favorable to the infringing State or, alternately, to sow
distrust in the elections and in democratic governance more broadly.216 To
210
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the extent that even corruptly obtained silence and inaction in response to
such conduct may operate as a normative hydraulic force signaling no
disapproval by the targeted states, the infringing State’s cyber activities may
come to be seen as internationally lawful or at least not wrongful under
international law principles.217

V.

CORRUPTLY OBTAINED SILENCE

In addition to the unsettled international law questions that
commentators have identified in the context of cyberspace more generally,
this particular scenario (i.e., the silence of government heads corruptly
obtained) also raises a number of distinct, but related, issues concerning some
of the more granular details of how international law may apply to cyberbased information warfare once the ingredient of domestic cooperation,
cooptation, or complicity has been introduced—issues that pertain to the
specific elements of consent (in relation to the sovereignty principle) and
coercion (in relation to the non-intervention principle), and that, to date, have
not been addressed. More particularly, missing from the scholarly and State
treatment is the role that corruption, and relatedly, the role of silence, could
play in securing consent under the sovereignty principle or in functioning as
coercion under the non-intervention principle. This Part identifies some of
the relevant questions relating to consent and coercion, with a view toward
promoting scholarly inquiry into, and discussion of, the ways in which
strategic corruption may distort international law development, particularly
as applied to cyber operations that use conspiracy theories and disinformation
to manipulate democratic opinion-making.
intelligence community reports, and prompting questions about the legitimacy of the
democratic process itself.” CATHERINE A. THEOHARY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE REPORT, INFORMATION WARFARE: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 10
(Congressional Research Service, 2018). After the election, during his tenure in the
Oval Office, Donald Trump routinely promoted conspiracy theories and
disinformation to the benefit of foreign adversaries of the United States. Whether he
did so as a result of corruption or compromise, or whether he was merely a fellow
traveler, remains a matter of speculation. Nevertheless, his willingness to promote
the weapons of foreign information warfare, and his repeated refusal even to
acknowledge Russia’s role, see, e.g., Hongju Koh, supra note 210, at 452. some
plausibility to the extreme hypothetical scenario presented herein.
217
If not internationally wrongful, then, no State would have a right of response
under international law to such conduct. In a less extreme scenario, an infringing
State could manage to obtain silence or inaction from less than a critical mass of
target states, thereby delaying the formation of an international norm prohibiting the
conduct question, but not necessarily creating a countervailing norm.
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A. Consent and the Principle of Sovereignty
Separate and apart from the question of whether silence acts as a
perhaps unintentional norm-creating force in international law development
is the question of whether silence itself can operate as consent.218 The
principle of sovereignty protects a State from territorial intrusions by another
State.219 Breach of the sovereignty principle occurs when the infringing State
exerts power in the target State’s territory without consent, or interferes with
inherently governmental functions of the target State.220 At the most
fundamental level, sovereignty means that a State may make freely its
“choice of a political, economic, social and cultural system, and the
formulation of foreign policy.”221 Accordingly, a State which conducts
activities in another State’s territory concerning that other State’s inherently
governmental functions commits a violation of sovereignty under
international law.222 A target State, however, may consent to such activities
by another State, thereby nullifying what would otherwise constitute a
violation of sovereignty.223 The consent exception under the principle of
sovereignty raises the question of whether a target State’s silence or passivity
in the face of otherwise sovereignty-violating conduct by another State can
or does operate as implied consent to, or ratification of, the otherwise
internationally wrongful activity.224 Contextualizing the issue more
discretely, given the limited scope of this Article, the question becomes
whether a target State’s silence or failure to respond to a foreign State’s use
of cyberspace to wage an information warfare campaign consisting of
218

Regarding silence as an unintentional norm creation, see supra notes 201‒
202 and accompanying text.
219
The Case of the S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), Judgment, No. 1, p. 18 PCIJ
(series A) (September 7, 1927) (stating that the “first and foremost restriction
imposed by international law upon a State is that—failing a permissive rule to the
contrary—it may not exercise power in any form in the territory of another State”).
220
Inherently governmental functions “are understood as activity at the very core
of state authority, including the activities of the authorities responsible for foreign
and military affairs; legislation and the exercise of the police power; and the
administration of justice.” MOYNIHAN, supra note 122, at 15.
221
Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Para. 205 ICJ 14. (June
27, 1986).
222
MOYNIHAN, supra note 122, at 15.
223
Id. at 19.
224
For discussion of the role that silence plays in the international legal
framework, see Helen Quane, Silence in International Law, 2014 BRIT.Y.B. INT’L L.
240.
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conspiracy theories and disinformation for the purpose of affecting voter
behavior in the target State effectively constitutes consent.
A host of reasons may explain why a State may opt for silence in this
and other contexts,225 of course, and these considerations arguably weigh
against concluding that silence, without more, operates as consent, especially
in relation to cyber activities. For example, responses to cyber operations that
involve the military may implicate specific “operational concerns” which not
only counsel, but indeed require, “a certain degree of reticence . . . to avoid
revealing protected information,” especially in “emerging areas of
warfare.”226 In addition, some silences may result from a State’s considered
judgment that a binding international rule has not yet crystallized, and such
silences reflect nothing more than the absence of an existing norm applicable
to the particular situations under scrutiny.227 Relatedly, silence may signal a
position of “strategic ambiguity”228 wherein a State elects to “refrain from
articulating a position while the law develops and the State considers its
options for compliance,”229 perhaps motivated by a desire to retain as much
leeway as possible in the cyber realm based upon a belief that binding rules
could run counter to the State’s own national interests.230 Finally, a State may
choose to remain silent because of “internal disagreement within [that] State”
regarding the rights and obligations currently in place under international
law.231 These considerations, one or more of which may account for why
states have, at times, publicly proclaimed that certain cyber activity taken by
another State breached international law but have declined to identify the
specific nature of the international obligation that has been violated, prompt
a number of questions.232 One is whether the reason motivating a State to
adopt a posture of silence, in response to another State’s cyber operations
225

Ronald Alcala, OPINIO JURIS AND THE ESSENTIAL ROLE OF STATES,
ARTICLES OF WAR, LIEBER INSTITUTE WEST POINT (Feb. 11, 2021), https://lieber.w
estpoint.edu/opinio-juris-essential-role-states/; MOYNIHAN, supra note 122, at 910; Dan Efrony & Yuval Shany, A Rule Book on the Shelf? Tallinn Manual 2.0 on
Cyber Operations and Subsequent State Practice, 2018 AM. J. INT’L L. 583.
226
Alcala, supra note 225.
227
Id.
228
MOYNIHAN, supra note 122, at 10.
229
Alcala, supra note 225; MOYNIHAN, supra note 122, at 9-10; Efrony & Shany,
supra note 226, at 588.
230
Efrony & Shany, supra note 225, at 653.
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Alcala, supra note 225.
232
MOYNIHAN, supra note 122, at 4 and note 15 (citing example responses from
the United States and the United Kingdom to cyber-attacks targeting sites in those
states).
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targeting it, should have any implications for customary international law
development. Another is whether any additional considerations (whether
they be supporting or countervailing) come into play regarding a State’s
silence on the application of international law when those cyber activities
propagate conspiracy theories or disinformation aimed at the polity of the
target State to affect democratic opinion-making there.233 As a practical
matter, “activities that contravene the non-intervention principle and
activities that violate sovereignty will often overlap in terms of outcome.”234
A logical consequence of that relationship may be that consent and coercion
also, at times, intersect if not overlap. Accordingly, a separate, but related
question is what, if any, are the implications for international law
development if a State’s silence is deemed to be consent and that silence is
rooted in a more nefarious motivation, such as when that silence has been
coerced or corruptly obtained by the infringing State. For example, if silenceas-consent has been coerced or corruptly obtained, does the principle of nonintervention become applicable? Relatedly, can silence obtained by
corruption operate as coerced consent, and if so, does the coercive nature of
the corruption both violate the non-intervention principle and nullify the
consent ostensibly granted, thereby also breaching sovereignty?235

B. Coercion and the Principle of Non-intervention
As some of the foregoing questions suggest, the principles of
sovereignty and non-invention are closely related, and, accordingly, conduct
that violates one is likely, in many instances, to violate the other. They are
distinct, however, and the primary feature differentiating them is that a
violation of the non-intervention principle requires coercive behavior by the
infringing State, whereas the sovereignty principle does not.236 Accordingly,
the degree of overlap between the two principles will rest, in part, upon how
broad or narrow a definition of coercion is adopted for purposes of the

233

See discussion infra Part IV.C.
MOYNIHAN, supra note 122, at 48; Schmitt & Vihul, supra note 123, at 1653
(describing State sovereignty and coercive intervention as related but distinct
“prescriptive norms”).
235
This question—though posed here in the specific context of information
warfare targeting another State using conspiracy theories and disinformation
campaigns—is widely applicable to the questions of consent and coercion in various
contexts involving the international legal system more generally.
236
MOYNIHAN, supra note 122, at 48 (citing TALLINN 2.0 MANUAL, para 84 or
commentary to Rule 4).
234
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analysis.237 Assuming, for purposes of this discussion that a broad conception
of coercion ultimately crystallizes, the following articulation is useful:
“pressure on the victim State to deprive the target of its free will in relation
to the exercise of its sovereign powers in order to compel conduct or an
outcome with respect to a matter reserved to the target State.”238 On this
understanding of coercion, significant overlap exists between the principles
of sovereignty and non-intervention in relation to the coercive conduct
because such conduct could encompass activity that merely “hamper[s] the
target State in . . . the exercise of its sovereign functions in some way,”
reflecting a close similarity “to the conception of violation of sovereignty as
one State’s exercise of unauthorized power that usurps the target State’s own
independent authority . . . .”239
In the context of cyber activities the Tallinn Manual 2.0 reflects the
international consensus, stating that, “[c]yber operations that prevent or
disregard another State’s exercise of its sovereign prerogatives constitute a
violation of such sovereignty and are prohibited by international law.”240 In
light of the ICJ’s recognition in the Nicaragua case that the principle of
sovereignty encompasses a State’s authority to decide freely its “choice of a
political . . . system,”241 international law experts agree that one of the
“inherently sovereign functions” of a democratic State is the administration
of free and fair elections.242 If sovereignty is treated not as a standalone rule
that itself can be violated, however, then the potential violation must be
analyzed under the non-intervention principle. Accordingly, to the extent that
a State’s cyber operations interfere with the elections of another State—an
inherently governmental function which a State is permitted to decide
freely—the question becomes whether the cyber activities constitute
coercion, thereby breaching the non-intervention principle. More
specifically, for the limited purposes of this discussion, the question is
whether cyber-based information warfare using conspiracy theories and
disinformation to manipulate democratic opinion-making in the target State
237

MOYNIHAN, supra note 122, at 48; Ohlin, supra note 123, at 1518. (“The
concept of coercion can be defined narrowly or broadly, with huge consequences for
the outcome of the analysis in this case.”).
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MOYNIHAN, supra note 122, at 48.
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Id.
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Schmitt & Vihul, supra note 123, at 1647 (TALLINN MANUAL 2.0,
Commentary to Rule 4).
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Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States of America), Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 205 (June 27).
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MOYNIHAN, supra note 122, at 40.
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qualifies as coercion under the non-intervention principle. The general
consensus appears to be yes.243 As one commentator notes, “[t]he most
prominent group of experts writing on cyberwar and cybersecurity has
declared that ‘[i]llegal coercive interference could include manipulation . . .
of public opinion on the eve of elections, as when [among other things] . . .
false news is spread . . . .’”244 Another contends that, in addition to
“nullif[ying] the genuine expression of authority and will by the people,”
information warfare that employs disinformation targeting voting behavior
“also taints the internal or external manifestation or expression of authority
and will by the government that emerges” from the electoral process, thereby
violating the principle of non-intervention.245
The prevailing analyses, however, presuppose a public response by
the target State that seeks to diffuse the effects of any such information
warfare on the target polity, either before a given election or afterward. For
example, Department of State Legal Adviser Brian Egan, speaking on behalf
of the Obama Administration, provided the following public legal
interpretation in response to Russia’s hack and release of DNC emails during
the 2016 election period: “[A] cyber operation by a State that interferes with
another country’s ability to hold an election or that manipulates another
country’s election results would be a clear violation of the rule of nonintervention.”246 Similarly, one would expect forceful public pushback
against a foreign State that were to remain silent, then the possibility, at least,
exists that the target State’s silence may be deemed to operate as consent

243

Hongju Koh, supra note 210, at 450 (taking the position that “coercive
interference in another country’s electoral politics—including the deliberate
spreading of false news—constitutes a blatant intervention in violation of
international law”); Barela, supra note 8 (arguing that a foreign power weakening
confidence in the legitimacy of a democratic election should be interpreted as an act
of coercion); MOYNIHAN, supra note 122, at 42 (stating that “[c]oercive efforts to
manipulate voting behavior could also amount to intervention in another state’s
affairs”).
244
Hongju Koh, supra note 210, at 450 (quoting TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS (2d ed. 2017).
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Tsagourias, supra note 163, at 13-14 (explaining that “the principle of nonintervention protects against external interference the expression of authority and
will by the people and also protects the conditions that enable the people to form
authority and will freely and make free choices”).
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Brian J. Egan, Remarks on International Law and Stability in Cyberspace,
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Nov. 10, 2016), https://20092017.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/264303.htm.
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under the principle of sovereignty,247 which, in turn, could potentially cast
the coercion inquiry under the non-intervention principle in a different light.
That is, if the target State, for some reason, acting in its own best interest,
adopts silence strategically as an indication of voluntary consent, then the
perpetrating State has not acted coercively. However, if the perpetrating State
obtains the target State and consequently fails to expose its own polity to the
foreign State’s interference in the electoral discourse, then perhaps the
coercion element should be deemed met.248

C. Willing Complicity and Self-Determination
Although the questions that are the focus of this Article relate
primarily to strategic corruption as a potential force in the development of
international law as applied to cyber activities that use disinformation or
conspiracy theories to affect the voting behavior of another State’s
population, the examples from Poland and the United States of domestic
leaders’ willingness to use these tactics of information warfare against their
own citizens for political gain reveal an additional relevant inquiry: how to
address the question of willing, as opposed to coerced, complicity by a target
State in actively perpetrating foreign-based conspiracy theories and
disinformation campaigns against its own people.
This issue presents even more difficult analytical considerations
pertaining to the questions of consent and coercion. At first blush, there
would seem to be no violation of sovereignty because consent—in the form
of active propagation by instruments of the State—is willingly granted, and
the willingness of the grant of consent means the absence of coercion, and
therefore, no breach of the non-intervention principle. Considering the issue
through the added prism of the right to self-determination, however, may
provide a more nuanced analysis.
247

See discussion supra, Part IV.A.
Of course, one of the difficulties for international law development in this
regard is the public disclosure or exposure of the corruption that would be necessary
to apply international law principles to this scenario. Moreover, the questions of what
constitutes corruption and how international law treats transnational corruption fall
beyond the scope of this Article, but they merit further scholarly attention in the
context of malign cyber operations, including information warfare. For a history of
anti-corruption features in the international legal system through the Twentieth
Century, see Alejandro Posadas, Combating Corruption under International Law, 10
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 345 (2000). For treatment of the more recent problem of
strategic corruption, that is, corruption as national strategy employed against a target
State, see Zelikow, supra note 214.
248

2022] An International Law Perspective on Political Informational Warfare

683

The principle of self-determination recognizes the collective right of
a people to express their independent sovereign will by freely choosing the
“political arrangements” that will govern them and the public policy flowing
therefrom.249 International law recognizes this principle in a host of formal
instruments. For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights recognizes “the right and the opportunity” of every citizen “without .
. . unreasonable restrictions . . . [t]o vote and to be elected at genuine periodic
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by
secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors.”250
The United Nations Friendly Relations Declaration, under which signatories
assume an affirmative duty not to engage in coercive conduct that violates a
people’s collective rights to self-determination, freedom, and independence,
offers another example.251 When considering these provisions, and others
like them, international law experts have opined that the distorted electoral
discourse and opinion-making that coalesce under conditions imposed upon
a polity by a foreign State’s cyber-based information warfare disrupt the
legitimate internal processes by which the polity freely chooses its political
system and resulting policy and that this disruption deprives the polity of its
“capacity to self-determination as self-governance.”252
An important characteristic of the self-determination principle
distinguishing it from the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention is
that it is a right that flows not to a sovereign nation but to a sovereign people.
Democratic governance is based upon the core notion that the political
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Ohlin, supra note 123, at 1580. (“[S]elf-determination [is] a legal concept
that captures the right of a people to decide, for themselves, both their political
arrangements (at a systematic level) and their future destiny (at a more granular level
of policy.”).
250
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 25, Dec. 9, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (ratified June 8, 1992).
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G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at annex, State (Oct. 24, 1970) (providing that states
have an affirmative duty not to engage in actions that deprive peoples of their rights
to self-determination, freedom, and independence).
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Tsagourias, supra note 163, at 14. (“When a state assumes control over a
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as self-governance . . .”); Hongju Koh, supra note 210, at 451. (“An external attempt
to distort the information that voters possess when they go to the polls also violates
the human rights of the electors under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.”).
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system and its resulting policies represent the will of the people.253 In a
democracy, the people express their “sovereign will” through elections.254 A
foreign State’s interference “with the structures and the environment that
condition and facilitate the formation of authority and will by the people”
works a substitution of “the legitimate process of self-determination with an
artificially constructed process in order to generate particular attitudes and
results to serve its particular interests” and has the consequence of
“control[ling] not only the attitudes, will and choices of the people, but also
the will of the government that emerges.”255 Accordingly, a foreign State’s
use of conspiracy theories or disinformation campaigns to distort and disrupt
the target State’s electoral discourse and to manipulate the voting behavior
therein may be understood as replacing the “sovereign will” of the target
State’s polity with that of the foreign State.256 On this understanding, the
harm from a State’s use of conspiracy theories and disinformation campaigns
to affect democratic opinion-making in another State flows primarily to the
people of the target State, not to the target State itself.257 In this way—by
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Ohlin, supra note 123, 1595. (“The whole point of democratic governance is
that the government should represent the will of the people, and this relationship
might be called the ‘sovereign will.”) (distinguishing between the notion of
sovereign will of a people as political terminology and the principle of State
sovereignty as used by public international lawyers and arguing that the right to selfdetermination rather than the principle of sovereignty is the appropriate rubric for
analyzing election interference targeting democratic opinion-making).
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is the ultimate expression of a people’s sovereign will” and that the Russian
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curtailing the ability of the target State’s people to express their sovereign
will—the infringing State violates the principle of self-determination.258
For commentators who have concluded that self-determination is an
appropriate analytical framework for determining the international
lawfulness of a foreign State’s cyber-based conspiracy theory or
disinformation campaigns targeting the democratic opinion-making by the
polity of another State, two diverging approaches have emerged, based upon
different understandings of the relationship between the principle of selfdetermination and the principle of non-intervention. One understanding
disaggregates the principle of self-determination from the principle of nonintervention and its coercion requirement.259 This view of self-determination
holds that the act of interference itself, without regard to whether or not it is
coercive, causes the harm and therefore the violation.260 The second
conception views the right to self-determination as a protection giving rise to
the principle of non-intervention.261 This approach, in other words, would
treat the non-intervention principle as an integral component of the right to
self-determination:
By aligning the principles of non-intervention and selfdetermination, the normative and operational scope of the
principle of non-intervention shifts. More specifically, the
domain and object of intervention shifts from the
government to the actual power holder, the people, and to
the process of forming authority and will through which the
goal of free choice is also attained. Whereas the government
as the depository of such authority and will is protected by
the principle of non-intervention, [the State] is not the
258

Id. Elsewhere, Professor Ohlin writes:
An election is supposed to be an expression of that polity’s
collective will, as a fulfillment of their collective right of selfdetermination, and outside interference has a distortionary impact
on the discourse and threatens to transform what would otherwise
be an expression of the polity’s will with an expression of some
other polity’s will.
Ohlin, supra note 171, at 15.
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Tsagourias, supra note 163, at 14. (“When a state assumes control over a
matter at the expense of the state which has a legitimate claim of authority and will
over that matter because it falls within its sovereign prerogatives, it effectively
curtails the latter’s capacity to self-determination as self-governance, which . . . [is]
protected by the principle of non-intervention.”).
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primary object of protection as the traditional reading holds,
but a derivative one; the primary object of protection are the
people and the process of authority and will formation.262
Whether treated as a wholly separate protection or as an adjunct to the nonintervention principle, the right to self-determination would deem a foreign
government’s utilization of conspiracy theories and disinformation
campaigns to deprive the target State’s polity of its free choice in exercising
its sovereign will as impermissible under international law. Moreover, both
approaches also tend to support the view that the willing acceptance and
perpetuation by a target State, acting in its sovereign capacity, of a foreign
State’s cyber activities that weaponize conspiracy theories and
disinformation campaigns to manipulate democratic opinion-making in the
target State should not operate to nullify protections accorded under the right
of self-determination. This is so because the right resides in the people, not
in the State.263 A State’s cyber activities used to wage information warfare
thus may violate the sovereign will of the target State’s polity and,
accordingly, violate their right to self-determination, even when the target
State’s government purports to consent or invite the foreign State’s
activities.264

VI.

CONCLUSION

By way of concluding, this Part provides a brief summary and offers
recommendations for further study. Current international law framework for
addressing cyber operations is adequate. There is no need for cyber-specific
rules. The current international law framework consists of multiple
principles that could govern determinations of whether particular cyber
operations constitute permissible or impermissible activities. Among the
most discussed possible applicable principles are sovereignty and nonintervention. A third, less discussed, option is the principle of selfdetermination. It is yet unclear which of these principles will anchor the
analysis, and a number of related subsidiary issues remain unsettled.
262
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264
Of course, to the extent that a complicit domestic government utilizes or
allows foreign-based information warfare against the domestic population, any
remedy to which a State might avail itself on behalf of its polity for a violation of the
self-determination principle under such circumstances would need to await a new
government in the target State, a condition which assumes that the democratic
processes retain sufficient vigor to overcome the anti-democratic forces aligned
against them.
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Regarding sovereignty, international law prohibits the intrusion of a
State’s territorial integrity, sovereign equality, or political independence by
another State. This prohibition may be nullified if a State consents to the
intrusion. Disagreement exists as to whether sovereignty is a standalone rule,
the violation of which gives rise to a right of response, or whether it is merely
a guiding principle, which cannot itself be violated, but which serves both as
a channeling function for State action and as the fount for other binding
norms, of which one is the principle of non-intervention. If sovereignty is
treated as a rule, then its breach may occur by territorial manifestation of
foreign State conduct in the target State or by a foreign State’s intrusion on
the inherent government activities of the target State. Under this framework
of sovereignty-as-rule, a foreign State’s opinion-influencing cyber operations
using conspiracy theories or disinformation to affect democratic electoral
outcomes are unlikely to violate the target State’s sovereignty under the
territorial manifestation prong. Such operations might potentially violate the
sovereignty rule under the inherent government activities prong, but this
issue remains unclear. If sovereignty treated as only a guiding principle, then
such operations cannot violate sovereignty, but must instead be analyzed
under other, binding rules that flow from the principle of sovereignty.
One potentially applicable rule is the principle of non-intervention,
which prohibits a State from coercively interfering in the inherently
governmental functions of another State. Disagreement exists in this area of
international law regarding the definition of coercion. Under a narrow
definition, a foreign State’s cyber-based influence campaigns propagating
conspiracy theories and disinformation to manipulate democratic opinionmaking in another State’s electoral processes do not rise to the level of
coercion and therefore do not run afoul of the non-intervention principle.
Under a broader definition, however, such conduct could constitute coercion,
and the offending State would accordingly be in breach of the nonintervention rule.
The right of self-determination holds that any form of foreign
interference, whether direct or indirect, with a sovereign State’s internal
affairs violates international law. Some commentators view the right to selfdetermination as inextricably linked with the non-intervention principle for
determining such violations, while at least one scholar takes the view that
self-determination operates as a stand-alone principle which can be violated
when a foreign State launches cyber operations that use conspiracy theories
and disinformation campaigns to manipulate the democratic opinion-making
of a target State.
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Absent treaty agreements governing these types of cyber-based
campaigns, customary international law will, over time, likely coalesce and
provide answers to at least some of the unsettled questions relating to the
various possible principles that could apply to cyber-based disinformation
campaigns. To crystallize into binding rules, customary international law
requires State practice and opinio juris, but a target State’s silence or inaction
in response to another State’s hostile activities can also operate as a normcreating force in international law, leaving greater leeway for an infringing
State to ratchet up the standard for what conduct is sufficiently egregious to
warrant a right of response by the target State under international law. To the
extent that this is so, international law experts’ calls for clarity from states
regarding cyber operations should be heeded. In addition to providing clarity
on these questions, however, states—and international law experts—would
also do well to engage deliberately and prophylactically with a number of
peripheral questions concerning the international law implications of State
silence, particularly concerning consent and coercion, including questions
that address a target State’s corruptly obtained silence or passivity in
response to the weaponized use of cyber operations to manipulate democratic
opinion-making.

